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ABSTRACT
This thesis discusses the use of the Rhine River by Juiius Caesar in his
commentaries, De Bello Gallico, covering the Gallic Wars of approximately 58 to 52
B.C., to identify the peoples and territories separated by its current. This thesis addresses
the issue of how Caesar understood this division of space, what criteria he employed to
support his use of the river, and his portrayal of these matters within his account. It seeks
to clarify the foundation of a major national border of western history in the context of its
initial involvement in the context of the Roman Late Republic.
This thesis approaches the question of Caesar’s use of the Rhine from a literary
perspective. It places an emphasis on contemporary sources and Caesar’s own text, with
the aim of understanding their rhetorical value as applied to the identification of
unfamiliar groups and places. It adopts as its principal theoretical framework a model in
which ideas of identity, civilized customs, and foreign relations operate to clearly
demarcate areas and communities regardless of specific contacts or military campaigns.
This thesis concludes that, contrary to how such a border is thought of today, the
Rhine was understood to be an ethnic border after the later campaigns of the Gallic War
had discredited its original political aspect. First employed to separate those with whom
Rome had close relations from those with whom it did not, the Rhine evolved both during
the conflict and in the texts into a cultural divide between groups based on their
possession of what the Romans considered civilized habits.
vi

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Whether one thinks of war in terms of propaganda or body counts, few wars in
western history are as infamous as those of Julius Caesar. The Gallic War is particularly
well known because of Caesar's own account, the De Bello Gallico (BG), which details
the conflict in seven books (with an eighth written by one of Caesar’s lieutenants). The
conflict began in 58 B.C. with an influx of Germani into a portion of Gaul inhabited by
Rome’s allies, and ended in 52 after the end of Gallic resistance to Roman dominion.
The Gallic War extended Rome’s sphere from the Alps and the Rhone to the English
Channel and the Rhine, entirely incorporated the various Gallic groups, and excluded the
Germani, who were left on the outside fringe of Rome’s influence. The Rhine River,
which was of limited significance at least through the first years of the war, would
become the classic western border of Rome during the Principate and the traditional
dividing line between Gaul and Germany in western history. These political and
geographic consequences of Caesar’s proconsulship in Gaul are one reason that the Gallic
Wars and the BG attract so much attention among western scholars. A second reason is
the text’s demographic impact. Through his reporting, Julius Caesar established the
distinctions identifying the inhabitants on either side of the Rhine River.
This paper examines the BG to determine the principal stages of development in
Julius Caesar’s Rhine policy and its ethnographic impact. The Rhine River acted first as
1

a political barrier between communities and evolved into an ethnic dividing line,
juxtaposing Callus and Gemtanus. This becomes evident when Book One is compared
to the text's later books. As Caesar’s military goals changed, the function of the Rhine
expanded as an element in dealing with his opponents. Caesar's differentiation between
the Galli and the Germani, the criteria used, and the power relationships represented all
evolve throughout the text. This thesis will argue that the roles of both the boundary and
the ethnic distinctions originated in a relatively limited, politically difficult campaign
along Rome’s immediate frontier. The evolution began when Caesar returned to the
Rhine in 55 B.C. during a later phase of the conflict and with new, if similar, goals. In
short, this paper will argue that Julius Caesar used the Rhine River as a political rather
than a strictly geographic border to both understand and identify Rome’s new frontier
zone and its inhabitants. This is a study in perception, identification, and the
objectification of ethnicity within an evolving military and political context.
The BG is the earliest extant text that provides any rationale for limiting Rome’s
dominion to the Rhine. There seems no reason to presume that the Rhine was ever a
natural border. Indeed, archaeological studies and traditional historiography have both
consistently noted the porous nature of the border - the natives on either side had
traditions of migration and contact, while Roman commanders, including Caesar, crossed
the river in several campaigns well into the first century A.D.12 Yet, the overall consensus
of the textual sources is that Germania was not subject to Rome in the fashion that its

1 Both archaeological and philological investigations have demonstrated that the river was neither a cultural
nor an ethnic divide. See Malcolm Todd, The Northern Barbarians 100 BC - AD 300 (London:
Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975), 19-29, 45, footnote 53; Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial
Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999), 76, footnote 176; Barry
Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory o f Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 428.
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provinces, such as Gaul, were. Rome’s traditional enemies, the peoples stressed in
speeches and artwork, were largely Gallic during the Republican period, but Germanic in
the Imperial. Thus, as the first text to record the evolution of west-central Europe and its
inhabitants in Roman perception, and one of few documents focused on provincial
matters during the Late Republic (c. 80-27 B.C.), the BG provides vital testimony as to
how the Romans organized their world.
This thesis views the text as a conscious argument by Caesar, made in a political
context, and therefore relevant to both his perceptions and his goals. While this approach
evades the question of the BG’s historicity and the objective course of the Gallic War, the
broader context requires explanation. One cannot employ the BG as a source without
taking a position on a number of related issues. This study’s argument is fundamentally
dependent on the content of the text coevolving with contemporary events. It is thus
inextricably linked to the theory of periodic composition, which assumes that the BG was
not originally composed as a unitary text after Caesar’s victory but book-by-book over
the duration of the conflict. This theory, which will be discussed in detail below, has
always had adherents among scholars but has possessed the burden of proof since all
extant manuscripts are finished copies. The theory of periodic composition better
explains the evolution that this study observes within the text than competing theories, so
it is adopted. To reflect this perspective, the plurality of Caesar’s campaigns will be
stressed, as both his theatre and his opponents ranged broadly during the conflict, the
Gallic Wars. To tie this paper into a broader theoretical framework, a discussion of some
essential matters of the modern historiography follows.
The Subject - A Difficult War
3

The Gallic Wars took place at an awkward juncture in the context of Roman
imperialism. A period of civil war had ended with Sulla’s victory decades earlier,
Rome’s attention remained on the Mediterranean and Pompey’s eastern dispositions, and
the (now obvious) rivalries within Rome had not yet exploded into a second period of
civil war. The Gallic Wars also sit astride opposing trends related to v<

different

sociopolitical periods and prevalent structures, namely the Republic with its aristocratic
competition and the Principate with its imperial centrality.23 Caesar’s professed motives
for the Gallic Wars suggest the oldeu traditional view of Roman imperialism that
emphasized a reluctance to provoke battle or take territory, but a determination to defend
existing positions.' Yet Caesar’s own accounts aslo imply an openly imperialistic
mindset, one driven by desire for personal glory, material wealth, and political control.4
There is also the geopolitical factor behind the war, that it was sparked by a threat to
Rome’s dominion, but pursued haphazardly due to the independent decisions of Caesar,
including whom to fight and where, rather than being waged with any consistent strategy

2 The transition is typically but not always characterized as a revolution and had several dimensions. See
Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939) for a predominantly social
perspective of this change, in which new classes from Italy replace the old Roman elite with new values
and interests; P. A. Brunt, The Fall o f the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) for a political
argument, in which the Italians are viewed as the same classes as in Rome, and thus only the membership is
new; Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, “Mutatio Morum: The Idea o f a Cultural Revolution,” in The Roman
Cultural Revolution, ed. Thomas Habinek and Alessandro Schiesaro (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998); Christine Meier, Caesar, transl. David McLintock (New York: BasicBooks, 1982), 491-496.
3 Tenney Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914); P. W. M. Freeman,
“Mommsen through to Haverfield: the origins o f Roman studies in late 19th century Britain,” in Dialogues
in Roman Imperialism: Power, discourse, and discrepant experience in the Roman Empire, ed. D. J.
Mattingly (Ann Arbor: Cushing-Malloy Inc., 1997). Cf. Sail. Cat., 6; E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in
the iMte Republic, second edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968). Ironically, the proponents of
“defensive imperialism,” especially Frank, viewed the Gallic Wars as Rome’s first truly offensive war.
4 William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979), 21-26, 98-99; John Rich, “Fear, greed, and glory,” in War and Society in the Roman World
(London: Routledge, 1993); J. E. Lendon, Empire o f Honor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
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or oversight from Rome.5 The question, in short, is how to understand what Caesar was
doing and why. The fact that one of the actors composed the primary account is a
blessing, in that the rationale provided (discussed in detail in Chapter Two) suggests the
mentality involved. In the 50’s B.C., Rome’s provinces, the territory directly
administered by magistrates, were often surrounded by allied or dependent groups. The
web of these diplomatic, commercial, and military ties extending outward from explicitly
claimed territory created a frontier zone. The inhabitants of the frontier zone were social
and political intermediaries, distinct from both those under Rome’s direct administration
and those living outside.6 This concept of the frontier zone best accounts for the goals
Caesar professes and the actions he takes, as the migration of peoples into this region
attracted his involvement due to the threat of upsetting existing relationships. The
creation and later modification of Caesar’s Rhine policy was to protect the prestige,
treaties, and the goods that flowed between Roman territory and those within the frontier.
Employing the concept of the frontier zone, the relevant portions of conflict can
be described as follows. In his campaign against the chieftain Ariovistus (58 B.C.),
Caesar insisted upon the Rhine as the boundary not to be crossed by Ariovistus’
followers, the Germani. The Rhine was at that point the territorial limit of the Sequani,
for whom Caesar was acting as a patron. By using the Rhine to settle the smaller dispute,
Caesar enclosed Gaul, completing a geographical region. His use of the Rhine also

5 J. S. Richardson, Hispaniae: Spain and the Development o f Roman Imperialism, 218-82B C. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986); Arthur M. Eckstein, Senate and General: Individual Decision-making
and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 B.C. (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1987).
6 Stephen L. Dyson, The Creation o f the Roman Frontier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
At first glance, this may seem a clarification o f the defensive imperialism model, but it is far more complex
as the frontier involves a mutual interchange between cultures and practices. For the army’s role in the
creation o f this provincial class, see N. J. E. Austin and N. B. Rankov, Exploratorio: Military and
Political Intelligence in the Roman World (London: Routledge, 1995), 91-102.
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identified • olkical territory and, sir.ee members of communities that benefited from a
Roman patron were themselves defined as clients of that person, created the expectation
of ethnic identity. The Rhine separated the “other” both implicitly and explicitly’,
because Caesar’s policy was not to permit any Germanus (a non-Gallus, a non-member
of the communities within the frontier zone) into Gaul.7 As the Gallic Wars progressed,
the frontier zone became enlarged, and Caesar campaigned on a wider basis. His activity
ranged to the Atlantic coast, along the way encountering hybridized peoples such as the
Eelgae and the Treveri, who lived as Galli but claimed Germanic lineage.
Beginning with the arrival of more Germanic immigrants, Caesar campaigned
among these mixed peoples and the river for a sustained period (55 to 53 B.C.). Like
Ariovistus before them, these new immigrants had no place within the frontier zone, but
the presence of peoples who claimed to have been Germani within the expanded frontier
questioned the old ethnic standard. Ultimately, Caesar distinguished the hybrids from the
newcomers by emphasizing their differences from the Germani and similarities to the
Galli within the initial frontier zone. Their right to exist within Gaul was demonstrated
by their Gallic way of life (in Roman terms, their humanitas and mores), which could be
incorporated into the new frontier. In other words, upon the conclusion of this second
phase (55 to 53), the Rhine no longer divided political units in terms of friends and

7 The Roman concept o f the “other” is difficult to identify, and one is often forced to retreat to a generic
perception o f not-like-us. As this paper operates within a framework that assumes some degree o f social,
political, and cultural ties among its subjects, and especially a Roman perception o f familiarity o f way of
life, a definition o f otherness can be attempted. An “other” was any group lacking in or o f unknown quality
regarding the relationships typical o f the Roman world, such as membership in a recognized polity, client
to a known patron, or willingness to pursue either. These relationships will be discussed more fully in
Chapter Three, and draw upon the analysis o f Roman ideas o f civilization and identity as discussed in Greg
Woolf, Becoming Roman: The Origins o f Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 1-23.
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enemies, but rather ethnicities in terms of civilization. This outline based on a frontier
concept will frame the narrative of this paper.
As this study relies overwhelmingly upon a single text, the nature of the document
deserves examination. The value of the BG is its first-hand testimony, as Caesar was an
observer for most of the conflict. This characteristic of the text makes it something of a
rarity, given that so few ancient sources generally survive or remain intact, with even
fewer by their own subjects. Unfortunately, these qualities are not entirely positive.
Julius Caesar was the author, main actor, and the editor of the BG, at least regarding its
content. The main purpose of the BG was to inform the Roman Senate, and as many
prominent men as possible, of Caesar’s activities. The text served Caesar’s own political
and class interests by promoting his reputation and strengthening his political position.
Caesar did not write as a detached observer but as an active participant in public affairs,
and the extant text likely originated in annual dispatches to Rome. The final form of an
edited, published text provided pro-Caesar source material for those who would write
histories and maintain Caesar’s reputation through the ages. The text was composed
neither to deceive nor to provide an objective account, but to support Caesar’s own
perceptions of events and arguments for his actions.8
The commentary, the genre of Roman literature of which the BG is an example,
has no modern equivalent but shares the characteristics of both a political autobiography
and a field report. In one of his letters, Cicero remarks: “An autobiographer must needs*7

8 For an introduction to Julius Caesar as an author, see R. M. Ogilvie, “Caesar,” in The Cambridge History
o f Classical Literature, volume two, Latin Literature, ed. E. J. Kenney (Cambridge: Cambrige Univeristy
Press, 1982), 283-285. For a discussion o f the BG’s place in the context o f literary history, see Christina S.
Kraus, “Forging a national identity: Prose literature down to the time of Augustus,” in Literature in the
Greek and Roman Worlds, ed. Oliver Taplin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 311-335.
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write over-modestly where praise is due and pass over anything that calls for censure.
Moreover, his credit and authority are less, and many will blame him and say that heralds
at athletic contests show more delicacy.”9 Cicero’s opinion testifies to the intellectual
environment in which the BG was written, delivered, and viewed. The Romans would
have expected some omissions or glosses that modern readers may find unfortunate, or
even unacceptable. As such, how one judges the BG as a source will determine not only
how one works with its content, but what types of questions may be dealt with. This
thesis is not primarily concerned with the text’s level of objective truth, but rather its
political commentary. This subjective focus derives from a long-term trend in modern
scholarship, one that has moved increasingly to accept Cicero’s opinion as a valid one.
Modem Commentators - Finding the Fiction
As suggested above, the Gallic Wars occurred at a difficult time within the
chronology of the Roman world. Julius Caesar was in many respects the fulcrum for the
transformation from Republic to Empire. As such, it is not unknown to view his life,
career, and adventures in Gaul, not to mention the Rhine River itself, with a hindsight
burdened by the existence of the Principate. Modern analysis finds the transformation
deeply engrained in the Late Republic and thus tends to assume the process inevitable.
Caesar and the Gallic Wars become a step in a master plan to obtain resources or gain
power. Scholars effectively confuse the consequences of Caesar’s actions for his
motivations. Indeed, the Gallic Wars are rarely a focus of study themselves despite the
existence of a detailed account. The conflict is instead famous for when it occurred and
who engineered it.8

9 Cic. Fam., 5.12, transl. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, New York, 1986.
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The key pioneer of Roman historiography was Theodore Mommsen, who heid an
exalted view of Caesar, but less so of the Gallic Wars. As the founder of the nowoutmoded idea of defensive imperialism, he had to differentiate between the man and the
conflict more than has since become common. In doing so, he maintained a position that
soon dropped out of fashion: “It is more than an error, it is an outrage upon the sacred
spirit dominant in history, to regard Gaul solely as the parade ground on which Caesar
exercised himself and his legions for the impending Civil War.’’101 Perhaps not
unexpectedly, the BG itself suggests this. Its first three books not only record
overwhelmingly successful campaigns, but also a Roman proconsul seemingly (and
perhaps apologetically) out of position to capitalize upon them." Granting the text’s
rhetoric, the value of such testimony is largely dependent upon the likelihood of periodic
composition, an idea that took time to achieve acceptance.
Interpretations of the Gallic Wars generally revolve around perceptions of Caesar,
and twentieth-century scholarship has largely split along national lines.12 English
scholars tend to be sympathetic, emphasizing Caesar’s good qualities and casting the
Gallic Wars as a historically progressive conflict. French scholars emphasize Caesar’s
personal interests and denigrate both the BG and the conflict it records as manifestations
10 Theodore Mommsen, The History o f Rome, transl. Reverend William P. Dickson, volume 3 (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1885), 257.
11 One aspect o f Caesar’s decisions in the first few books o f the BG that receives little attention was his
attempts to leave central Gaul (not technically one o f his provinces) for Illyricum (explicitly his
responsibility). Illyrian tribes had been causing trouble through piracy since at least the second century.
Several scholars have suggested, probably correctly, that Caesar expected to make his fortune in Illyricum
from the beginning. Caesar had a tendency to assume that each spectacular victory had eliminated
resistance. Caes. B Gall., 2.7 ,2 .3 5 , 3.1,5.1. Even if one argues that any battlefield would fit into a
proposed “program,” the tone o f the passages suggests that Caesar was most sensitive to not fulfilling his
prescribed duties as proconsul in the provinces.
12 These perceptions are often buried in the dialogue o f imperialism. See A. N. Sherwin-White, “Caesar as
an Imperialist,” Greece & Rome (March, 1957), 36-45. Perhaps submitting himself to this observation,
Sherwin-White argues (almost exclusively from the BG itself) that Caesar was not a particularly aggressive
(or ambitious) imperialist.

9

of ambition. They tend to assume actual deception. German scholars focus most
specifically upon Caesar, tending to cast him in the role of enlightened (or at least
capable) autocrat both governing and governed by events. Overall, whereas Mommsen
and contemporaries treated the BG in almost Boolean terms, the scholarly trend has been
away from what Caesar described and towards how he described it.
The English historian T. Rice Holmes is perhaps the most distinguished
commentator on the BG, and he is certainly the scholar with whom to disagree. Almost
as literal-minded in his approach as Mommsen, Holmes argued for the text’s overall
reliability and general accuracy (if not total precision), especially in terms of geographic
detail, lack of inconsistency, and general credibility.13 Holmes’ point of view remained
dominant for decades, encouraging many scholars to use the BG freely as an archival or
private source document without engaging its public nature. For Holmes, the validity of
the Rhine border was based on a broadly correct inteipretation of the pre-Roman state of
Gallic and Germanic settlement and not an arbitrary creation of Caesar. Holmes also
defended the integrity and basic objectivity of the narrative from aggressive French
“sciolists,” as some island scholars labeled their continental counterparts, who felt free to
“correct” the BG when it made mistakes.14 At this stage of scholarship, attention
remained concentrated on the accuracy of Caesar’s topographical descriptions while

13 T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest o f Gaul, second edition (New York: AMS Press, 1971). Holmes
provides the most recent full commentary (first edition 1899, second edition 1911, with reprints). Now
accepted as unduly literal partly to his use o f in-text proofs to settle disputes about the material, Holmes
himself merely claimed a minimal amount o f distortion, not a total absence of it.
14 T. Rice Holmes, “Signor Ferrero’s Reconstruction o f Caesar’s First Commentary,” The Classical
Quarterly (July, 1909), 203-215; T. Rice Holmes, “Signor Ferrero or Caesar?,” The Classical Quarterly
(October, 1910), 239-246; F. Haverfield, Review o f Caesar's Conquest o f Gaul, by T. Rice Holmes, The
Classical Review (December, 1911), 257-258. “Sciolist” is Haverfield’s term and is essentially an
accusation o f superficial quality of work paired with a haughtiness o f manner, as if the French believed that
they had discovered the true meaning o f the text and others were merely imaginative children.
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philology tested ethnographic divisions. A political aspect was assumed, but kept
separate from the narrated events. Like Mommsen and major commentators before him.
Holmes argued that Caesar produced the BG as one text, therefore limiting its propaganda
content. The argument was that Caesar composed and published the BG on the eve of the
civil war (c. 51-49 B.C.), so while it was definitely pro-Caesar, there could be little
development in material (such as the character of one of his lieutenants) from book to
book. Overall, from Mommsen to Holmes and many of their respondents, the SG’s
narrative largely overshadowed its rhetorical content.
While English scholars accused their French counterparts of being superficial and
too eager to attack, one French scholar, Michel Rambaud, offered a key challenge to the
dominant approach to the BG.' ' He addressed the “compiled” nature of the extant text.
Since its original composition and publication had a direct impact on Caesar’s ability to
control the perceptions of his contemporaries, Rambaud argued for a systematic process
by which annual dispatches become steadily reworked into an edited narrative, which
“appeared” on the eve of the civil war. This late date of publication was not
controversial, but Rambaud’s suggestion that the annual dispatches had smoothly and
steadily streamed out of Gaul as part of a deliberate public relations effort was. Where
Holmes championed the BG's essential truthfulness, Rambaud adopted the opposite
extreme. The text became essentially suspicious because of Caesar’s (assumed) control
over the flow of information. While he emphasized the public nature of the text,

15

Michel Rambaud, L ’Art De Im Deformation Historique Dans Les Commentaires De Cesar (Paris: les
Belles letters, 1956); E. T. Salmon. Review o f L ’Art De La Deformation Historique Dans Les
Commentaires De Cesar, by Michel Rambaud, American Journal o f Philology (1955), 201-203; J. F.
Gilliam, Review o f L ’Art De La Deformation Historique Dans Les Commentaires De Cesar, by Michel
Rambaud, American Historical Review (April, 1956), 614-615.
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Rambaud identified it as neither journal nor status report, but strictly as a public relations
piece.
Another school, largely German, approached the BG as a source to understand its
author, seeing the BG as a means of investigating Caesar’s thoughts and intentions since,
fact or propaganda, the text certainly advanced Caesar’s own point of view. Matthias
Gelzer advocated an image of Caesar as a purely political animal, whose constant interest
was in solidifying his own advancement in Roman public life, whether through popular
politics, military success, or prestige as successful literati.16 For Gelzer, the Gallic Wars
were not part of a cohesive plan, but rather the outcome of Caesar’s skill at manipulating
events to serve his interests. This perspective moves the BG from being either a neutral
by-the-numbers account or an inherently skewed source of information to one which has
strong elements of both but which is not exclusively either. Another scholar, Christian
Meier, one of the most influential modern biographers of Caesar, utilized the same
approach.17 Because the text indicates the habits and ideas of its author within the
context of Roman politics, he treated the BG as a journal. This treatment placed the BG
entirely in the biographical realm, despite acknowledgement of its public aspect. The
approach taken by this school evades questions of composition and acknowledges the
text’s public nature, but has the unique disadvantage of tying the BG too closely to the
personality of Caesar, leaving the narrated events in the shadows.
To varying degrees, scholars have treated the BG as an either-or matter. Either
Caesar reported with basic accuracy or he did not. Recently, however, the text, its

16 Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, transl. Peter Needham (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1968).
17 Christian Meier, Caesar, transl. David McLintock (NewYork: BasicBooks, 1995).
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reliability, and its publication have all come under reexamination. The best example of
this was a 1996 seminar, “Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter,” that produced a collection of
papers focused on basic questions about the text and its portrayal of events.

The

seminar’s puipose also included an explicit departure from the polar position exemplified
by Holmes and Rambaud, while pursuing the text’s presentation and composition as the
key foci. The collected papers generally approached the document from a literary
standpoint, finding meaning in narrative structure, Caesar’s choice of emphasis, and
similar characteristics relevant to a rhetorical document.*19 The seminarians also,
although not without exception, renewed the challenge Rambaud had earlier raised
regarding the single composition thesis, although eschewing his propagandistic
interpretation of the BG. The seminar’s underlying assumption, that how Caesar narrated
had as much meaning and purpose as what he narrated, is shared by this study.
The Text - A Case For Periodic Composition
The importance of periodic composition to this paper has already been mentioned.
The idea that each book of the BG was composed individually and later compiled into an
edited, published whole deserves additional discussion because the argument of this study
relies upon the development of the text itself. The development of ethnic distinctions
based on the political consequences of an earlier Rhine policy cannot be maintained, as
this study will attempt to do, if the BG consisted only of bare outlines or notes until the
coming of the civil war. In fact, there are several indications that the earlier forms of the

1S Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell, eds., Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as
Political Instruments (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998).
19 The present historiographic trend in both England and the United States is to employ literary analysis in
determining the meaning, purpose, and construction o f Caesar’s texts. Andrew M. Riggsby, Review of
Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and
Anton Powell, Bryn Mawr Classical Review (April, 1999).
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text's several books were closer to the finished product and that it was, in effect,
periodically composed.
One major category of evidence for periodic composition is Caesar’s developing
literary style. Scholars have long noticed changes in syntax and content as the
commentaries progress. One philologist who counted specific grammatical constructions
observed a trend from a legalistic style suitable to a field report in Book One to a much
more literary style, suggestive of attempts to reach a broader audience, later on,
especially by Book Four.20 For example, Book Five ends at a dramatic point in the story,
with the death of an enemy leader. The tendency of the other books, both before and
after, is to end at the finish of the campaign season. This is interesting because Books
Five and Six narrate a continuous campaign during the middle of a winter (54/53 B.C.),
which saw a major revolt along the Rhine. It is possible that this break exists because of
editing concerns in the final edition, such as book length or dramatic impact. One scholar
suggests, however, that such a change can also mean that Caesar deliberately manipulated
his narrative in the field, still recording the facts but weighting them to his benefit by
inserting a pause into a difficult campaign to suggest his ongoing success.21 One grave
danger to Rome’s assets becomes two lesser ones, at least within the perceptions of his
audience, and two prominent successes. This makes Caesar’s position seem less
precarious and the text seem more adventurous, which may indicate a larger prospective
audience. The suggestion is also intriguing because the deliberate use of the drama of the

20 J. J. Schlicher, “The Development o f Caesar’s Narrative Style,” Classical Philology (July, 1936), 212224. Schlicher suggests that the change was partly motivated by the glamour and adventure inherent in
Caesar’s expedition to Britain.
T. P. Wiseman, “The Publication of the De Bello Galileo,” in Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War
Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Welch and Anton Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co.,
Ltd., 1998).
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leader’s death emphasizes an increasing bent for complexity characteristic of a
developing style.
The other traditional support for periodic publication stems from inconsistencies
of content, such as apparent confusion between two groups at one point followed by
greater detail (and differentiation) in later books. This evidence, although rejected by
those like Holmes who found it unconvincing, was nonetheless used to support broader
interpretations of the text, including its purpose.22 Caesar’s commentaries do not betray
the type of third person omniscience common to after-the-fact narratives when the author
already knows the full consequences of an actor’s actions. This is most true regarding the
new people who had upset the status quo by crossing the Rhine. The changing face of the
Gerinani is a clear example of developing content, one that can most readily be accounted
for by the theory of periodic composition.
The modem concept of ethnicity does not, strictly speaking, have an equivalent in
the BG, although the standards of differentiation Caesar employed may be compatible.
As will be discussed in Chapter Two, the Romans tended to conflate peoples and their
territory, especially if either were unfamiliar to them. Furthermore, as will be discussed
in Chapter Three, markers of identity were in fact political (membership in a civitas) or
“racial” (,gens - in terms of physical stock like a breeding group or lineage). If the BG
was composed at one particular time, then one would not only expect Caesar’s use of the
Rhine to be consistent, but that the Germani (the people) and Germania (their land)
would appear at the same point in the text - just as Gaul and its inhabitants do. This is*15
22 Norman J. DeWitt, “The Non-Political Nature o f Caesar’s Commentaries,” Transactions and
Proceedings o f the American Philological Association (1942), 341-352. DeWitt’s view is in many ways
outdated, as his argument that “there is no need whatever to regard them as political literature” is simplistic.
His information on the BG's genre and inconsistencies is stronger.
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not the case. The Germani appear in Book One of the BG as the followers of Ariovistus.
Their relationship to Rome and the G Mi is an extension of their leader’s and their
identity is dependent upon this relit;
relation to Gaul, with verbs denou

iship. Caesar describes their whereabouts in
movement or location, such as transire (“to cross

over”) and incolere (“to live (in k occupy”), or a construction combining locus and esse
(“to be in a place”)."3 Treatment of the territory of these new people does not begin until
the description of the Usipete

md Tencteri in Book Four, but the focus remains

predominantly on the people not their land.*24 The first clear articulation of a Germania in
a strictly geographic sense in the BG occurs during a brief geographic description of the
mysterious isle of Britain.25 Once the narrative arrives at the revolt of 53 B.C., Caesar
speaks of the territo

nuch more freely. For example, the ethnographic section of Book

Six is not just a description of the habits and customs of peoples, but also oddities like
animals that exL within the actual land boundaries.26
The re' dt of Caesar’s first three years was to set the boundaries of a limited,
familiar Gam, one in which Rome had already established its diplomatic position and
which Ariovistus had threatned by continuing to transgress the Rhine. As he campaigned
along the Lower Rhine the next few years, Caesar found himself dealing with the

2J Some examples: (2.4) “plerosque Belgos esse ortos a Germanis Rhenumque antiquitus traductos (“most
o f the Belgians were o f German origin and had crossed the Rhine in ancient times”)”; (4.7) “in locis esse
Germanos audiebat (“he was listening to the Germani at that place”)”; (4.16) “ad ultimas Germanorum
nations (“to the limits of the nations of the Germani”)”.
24 Caes. B Gall., 4.4: “rnultis locis Germaniae triennium vagati ad Rhenum pervenerunt (“they happened
upon the Rhine after roaming for three years throughout Germania”).” Caesar’s choice o f pervenio appears
to be an example o f his downplaying the arrival o f the Usipetes and Tencteri, as it has a haphazard sense.
The effect is to weaken the idea of a land o f the Germani, and even the concept of Germania is fragmented.
25 Caes. B Gall., 5.13.
26 Caes. B Gall., 6.11: “[l]t seems not inappropriate to give an account o f the customs o f Gaul and
German[ia] and the differences between these two nations.” The BG says Galliae Germaniaeque, not
Gallorum et Germanorum. This has the tidy effect o f passing over possible difficulties such as where the
Treveri or Belgae fit into the schematic by speaking in terms o f regions instead o f ethnic groups.
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Germani (or their potential presence) more frequently, as well as peoples within Gaul
who claimed Germanic descent or did not live entirely in a familiar fashion.'

It is

understandable that Caesar would trace his path through Gaul in the narrative of the BG
regardless of when he composed the text. That the concept of a distinct land beyond
Gaul would follow the identification of newcomers within Gaul as its (former)
inhabitants suggests less knowledge about the land and newcomers at one point in the
text than another. In other words, the apparent lack of omniscience strongly implies
periodic composition.
This Study - Method and Sources
This thesis will argue that a conflict upon the Roman frontier in 58 B.C. resulted
in Julius Caesar adopting the Rhine River as a political and geographic boundary for
Gaul. It will further indicate how Caesar employed the Rhine and other criteria to draw a
sharp ethnographic distinction between the Galli and the Germani in the effort to create
and maintain a new frontier. This argument assumes that each book of the BG was
written soon after the events it describes and prior to the following one. Some basic
accuracy in narration is likewise assumed, but the BG will largely be held to its own
standard as a public text with its own argument. For the purposes of this paper, the
validity of Caesar’s claims do not rely on whether the Galli were actually physically,
linguistically, ethnically, racially, or nationally distinct from the Germani. They rely on27

27 It has been suggested that Caesar’s formulation o f the Germanic identity (beyond existing stereotypes)
was adopted by people as much as impressed upon them. If so, then Caesar’s rhetoric not only offered his
Roman audience a framework for northern geography, but also created a foundation for a future GalloRoman identity that seized upon the Rhine as a rallying point. Nico Roymans, “Romanization, Cultural
Identity and the Ethnic Discussion, The Integration o f the Lower Rhine Populations in the Roman Empire,”
in Integration in the Early Roman West: The Role of Culture and Ideology, ed. Jeannet Metzler, Martin
Millet, Nico Roymans, Jan Slofstra (Luxembourg: Musee National d ’Histoire et d ’Art, 1993), 47-64.
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the identifiers and reasons he presents because these factors, the basis of his perception,
would through the BG have the most authority and influence in the Roman world.
The BG is, of course, this study’s main source. Most auxiliary source material
comes from Cicero, whose letters and speeches not only have the virtue of being
contemporary but of a similar rhetorical type as the BG. Furthermore, Cicero was not
only of the same class, status, literary accomplishment, and influence as Caesar himself,
but Cicero’s brother Quintus served as one of Caesar’s legati. Given that Cicero and
Quintus exchanged letters during the conflict, he thus offers a useful standard to
determine the communication, effect, and typicality of Caesar’s information. Additional
primary sources are limited. The literary nature of the questions posed reduces the utility
of many traditional used sources for studying the Late Republic. Most literary sources
detailing the conflict ultimately derive from the BG limiting their usefulness for this
paper.
Reservations aside, a number of outside texts have their benefits. Given that part
of the argument is geographic, Strabo, the nearest and most complete geographer to the
Gallic Wars, provides some useful source material. There is some question whether
Strabo used the BG (he does not mention Caesar as a source), but he did have information
about Germania due to imperial campaigns seventy years after the Gallic Wars.28 In
addition, Strabo’s archival materials included Posidonius, now a lost source, who visited

28 Strabo Geogr., 7.1.9. The border did move beyond the Rhine and at least one Germanic group, the Ubii,
were allowed into Gaul during imperial times. This resulted in the creation o f two provinces o f Germania
on the eastern side o f the Rhine, an act significant for imperial administration, but less so for the continuity
o f the border itself. Strabo Geogr., 4.1.2-4.3.4; W oolf, Becoming Roman, The Origins o f Provincial
Civilization in Gaul, 38-40
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continental Europe decades before Caesar (although he did not travel as far).*" Strabo's
geography thus offers the best context for the acceptance and strength of Caesar’s own
claims. Other sources used include Polybius, Sallust, and Appian, mostly for background
and contextual material. This admittedly limited selection provides a fairly wide
spectrum of time and perspective, as each dealt with similar themes yet wrote
successively in relation to Caesar, with Polybius earlier, Sallust within the same period,
and Appian later. Finally, material sources, inscriptions especially, are comparatively
few for the period, and, although some notes on archaeology are used for comparative
putposes, these are not stressed.
This study has two chapters, each with two major sections. Chapter Two,
“Ancient Gerrymandering,” concentrates on the initial development of Caesar’s Rhine
policy in 58 B.C. with a specific focus on Book One. This chapter’s first section will
provide the background and context of the Gallic Wars and the institutional role Caesar
held. The second component wili follow the second half of Book One, as Caesar justifies
his conflict with Ariovistus. Chapter Two’s central argument will be that the Rhine
policy began the process of border creation by demarcating Rome’s hegemonic area and
discouraging outside interference with the Galli within. Chapter Three, “Separating the
Right from the Left,” will address the ethnographic aspects of Caesar’s decision,
including the consequences during the second period of the Gallic Wars which centered
along the river, in 55 to 53 B.C., with an especial focus on Books Four and Six. Its first
component will discuss the terminology and social structures that underlay Roman ideas
'9 He was not necessarily the first Greco-Roman explorer o f northern Europe. There is a possibility that
Pytheas o f Massilia may have traveled around the British Isles in the fourth century B.C. This is
disputable, however. O. A. W. Dilke, Greek and Roman Maps (London: Thomas & Hudson, Ltd., 1985),
29-30.
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of civilization and how these applied to Gaul. The second section will consist of Caesar’s
contrast between the Galli and Germani on the basis of these Roman ideas. Chapter
Three’s principal argument will be that, having set the Rhine as a political demarcation,
the river subsequently served as a means of categorizing peoples when new
circumstances required. Chapter Four will conclude this thesis. Overall, this study
emphasizes the influence of the BG and its author’s political motives in establishing the
ideological foundations of one of the principal borders of western history.
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CH APTER TWO
ANCIENT GERRYMANDERING
Few Latin students are unfamiliar with Caesar’s opening lines describing Gaul:
“The whole of Gaul is divided into three parts, one occupied by the Belgae, another
occupied by the Acquitani, and the third by those who we call the Galli, but are in their
own language Celtae. All of these groups differ among themselves in language, customs,
and laws [lingua, institutes, legibus]”?0 The passage goes on to describe the territorial
divisions between the three groups, with that of the Galli enclosed by the Rhone,
Garonne, Atlantic Ocean, the Belgae, and the Rhine.3031
These lines highlight the political decisions of Rome’s proconsul in Gaul. First,
the land of the Gauls (Gallia) is divided into three parts, each division hosting a distinct
people. The Galli are explicitly identified with the Celtae, those in the central portion
abutting Rome’s northernmost province (also a “Gallia”). The unit is a territory, but its
pieces are given in terms of their inhabitants. The word omnis, here meaning “in
entirety” rather than “all of,” is an appositi\ _ indicating the broadest possible use of
Gallia. The Belgae are not Celtae, and their presence indicates an end to the Celtae’s
range, yet they inhabit a part of Gaul and so have some claim to being Galli (see Chapter

30 Cues. B Gall., 1.1.
31 The common Latin word for “border,” “territory,” or “country,” especially in Book One, is finis. The
idea is that the borders enclose a specific space, a territory. Charlton Lewis, ed., A Latin Dictionary
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879). Caesar does not define Gallia as a whole with finis, he separates distinct
peoples into distinct parts marked by static features.
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Three). In other words, by explicitly identifying the Cellae with the Gaili, Caesar simply
clarifies the relationship between his theater of operations (Gaul, the whole broad region
where Gaili of any type roam) and those with whom he is involved (the Celtae, those of
the central portion whom he will call Gaili). The second sentence indicates what the
distinctions among these groups are (language, traditions, customs). The text goes on to
describe the Belgae, the strongest and least commercial of any of those peoples
mentioned. Caesar most explicitly credits their strength to their habit of fighting the
Germani, whom he has already identified as trans Rhenum (“across the Rhine”) and at
the limits of Gallic territory.32 The very first chapter of the first book of the BG has
already suggested distinctions and offered some rationale for them. As will be argued,
Book One is very much a deliberate piece of political rhetoric.
This chapter examines Caesar’s campaigns in 58 B.C., first against the Helvetii,
Gallic migrants, and then against Ariovistus, the leader of Germanic migrants. A specific
focus on Book One is necessary because it describes the first phase of Caesar’s use of the
Rhine River. It will be argued that the river became a border between the Gaili and the
Germani largely in consequence to the behavior of Ariovistus. The behavior the
Germanic chieftain (rex) in the BG functions in two ways. First, it serves as an apology
for Caesar due to Ariovistus’ status in relation to Rome. Second, it provides the drama of
Book One with a colorful villain who embodies undesirable behavior and thus allows
Caesar to highlight the better behavior of the Gaili. Caesar’s rhetorical case against
Ariovistus also parallels the establishment of the Rhine in terms of the frontier zone. The
applicability of this model also necessitates some discussion of the beginning of the war.
32

Caes. B Gall., 1.1.
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Book One’s portrayal of the Galii and Germani, upon which Caesar based his use of the
Rhine, derives from Caesar’s attempt to maintain Rome’s existing relationships.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first addresses the context of the
Gallic Wars, including the events leading up to the conflict and a brief outline of the
proconsul's sociopolitical role within the frontier. This context emphasizes the political
terms of Caesar’s initial use of the Rhine by showing the expansion of Roman dominion
to the river and demonstrating the structures of that dominion. The second part focuses
more closely on the Rhine and discusses Caesar’s use of the river in relation to the
rhetorical argument against Ariovistus. In 58 B.C., Caesar was in a position to respond to
a perceived threat to the frontier and to define and restrict that threat by adopting the
Rhine as a border. He would be the first Roman to go past the river, but at first sought
only to prevent others from coming across.33
The purpose of Caesar’s Rhine policy was to prevent mass migrations of peoples
into the lands of those already secured. As proconsul, Caesar had the responsibility of
defending the frontier zone, thus maintaining Rome’s social and diplomatic network
beyond her own territory. If new populations like the Helvetii and Ariovistus’ Germani
displaced or weakened existing peoples, then the provinces would be exposed to attack,
financial investments in the provinces would be endangered, and, most importantly, the
prestige of Rome and the Senate would decline. The Romans tended to treat unfamiliar
groups as if they were autochthonous, as if they had always lived at their contemporary
location. In other words, what and who a people were depended upon where they were,

33 App. Gall., 1.5. Appian’s testimony to Caesar being a pioneer does not itself support a meaningful
distinction between the Galii and Germani. It does indicate that, whoever first described northern Europe,
Caesar was remembered as having the most authority.
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and vise versa.3435This made distant lands comprehensible and (as will be discussed in
Chapter Three) fit into Rome’s own social and diplomatic organization by linking the
people to the character of their leaders. The security of the frontier zone rested on the
fides (“trust,” or perhaps “credibility”) of all those involved, as the willingness to respect
the decisions of the Senate and adhere to treaties removed the need for expensive
campaigns. Politics was such that not all transgressors were equal. A key difference
between the Helvetii and the Germani was the recent accommodation between Rome and
Ariovistus, who Caesar portrays as unduly arrogant. The Helvetii, once defeated,
respond with appropriate submission. Caesar’s Rhine policy established an ethnic divide
in 58 B.C. only in that in separated two groups from each other. The significant
characteristics of those groups were political, essentially relating to how either fit into
Rome’s sphere of influence. Gallia and the Galli were incorporated, those outside it were
not. The Rhine would mark the frontier’s expanded area and block a people proven to be
untrustworthy.
The Gallic Wars - From the Beginning
The relationship between Roman and Gallus was ancient even in Caesar’s time.33
Rome fought enemies in every direction throughout her history, but only the north

34 Cic. Scaur., 17.39; Elizabeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1985), 250-266; Benjamin Isaac, The Invention o f Racism in Classical Antiquity
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2004), 134-137. Much o f Rome’s classification o f peoples
depended upon the area they inhabited, with environmental factors or moral habits explaining their abilities
and behavior. For Gaul, see Charles Ebel, Transalpine Gaul: The Emergence o f a Roman Province
(Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 49-51.
35 Polybius offers the first “comprehensive” descriptions o f the Celts, probably by the 150’s B.C., through
their fighting with Hannibal or in Rome’s Cisalpine, Eastern, or Hispanic wars. Some time in the 80’s,
Poseidonius traveled through parts o f Gallia Comata, but his account survives only in other sources
(especially Strabo). For all the contact with Gauls within the provinces, little survives that was written
about them in the intervening years. Nonetheless there is an interesting contrast in that Strabo, who had
more information than even Caesar, can describe the Gauls at great length, but runs out o f material on the
Germani much more quickly.
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provided an enemy that almost conquered her. Previously known as a plague to the
Etruscans, the Galli had violently established contact with Rome through the sack of the
city in the fourth century B.C. This event was so prominent in Roman memory, rhetoric,
and art that it suggests a new year zero in Rome’s sense of her own history.3637 Later, Galli
served as mercenaries, joining Hannibal in his invasion of Italy during the Second Punic
War, or fighting against Rome in Spain, Anatolia, and the Balkans.

37

Rome, in turn,

campaigned heavily in the north, defeating Gallic groups and seizing their territory,
especially in northern Italy (Cisalpine Gaul). The Germani, however, were relatively
new, first encountered by Rome roughly sixty years before the Gallic Wars.38 This
history of animosity has often placed Caesar’s concern for the Rhine in a sympathetic
light.
Despite continual conflict with them, Rome never had an explicit program to
conquer the whole of Gaul. Northward expansion was sporadic and the dominion of
Rome expressed itself through the frontier system. In 121 B.C., by aiding its Greek ally
Massilia, Rome carved out her northernmost province, Transalpine Gaul, west of the
Rhone on the southern coast of the continent. This conflict established the frontier zone
for which Caesar was responsible in 58. It consisted of the province between Hispania
and the Rhone, the allied city of Massilia securing the eastern flank, a broken enemy, the
Arverni, to the northwest, and Gallic allies, the Aedui, protecting the north. This system
precluded intensive campaigns further north by preventing any Gallic group within
36 J. H. C. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Rep'd^’
ai\ (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 140-142.
37 H. D. Rankin, Celts and the Classical U
nom Helm: Areopagitica Press, 1987), 100.
38 The name German
almost identical to a Latin word for “brotherly,” seems to have been of
Gallic origin. Henry H. Howorth, “The Germans o f Caesar,” The English Historical Review (Oxford:
University Press, 1908), 417-433.
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striking distance from gathering the support necessary to attack the province. There had
been a handful of campaigns conducted by earlier governors of Transalpine Gaul, but
Caesar was the first proconsul to face an actual threat to the frontier, with one exception.
The exception consisted of the Cirnbri and Teutoni, who engaged in a mass
migration into Gaul in the late second century B.C. They are almost universally
identified as Germani, possibly because of their origin beyond the Rhine, although no
text describing them predates the BG.i9 They spent nearly a decade harassing the Galli,
defeating Roman armies, and transgressing allied territory, until finally defeated at the
threshold of Italy by Caesar’s uncle-in-law Marius in 101 B.C. Scholars both ancient and
modern have made much of the near recreation of the fourth century invasion.*40 As will
be discussed below, the BG often recalls the Cirnbri, especially in Book One, as part of
Caesar’s justification of attacking Ariovistus.
Despite the near miss of the Cirnbri, the northern frontier remained stable through
the turmoil of the Social War and the conflict between Marius and Sulla (c. 91-83 B.C.).
These civil wars, fought respectively over the political rights of Rome’s Italian allies and
the prestige of commander1- ho championed different approaches to land reform,
continued to v

k the Republic until the early 70’s B.C. Regarding Gaul, Cicero could

scribe the region c. 69 as the “province of Gaul, which comprises a type of men and
communities which . . . have been quite recently subdued by our generals” under the
’9 For details on the Cirnbri, their homeland and ethnicity, see T. Rice Holmes, Caesar's Conquest o f Gaul,
second edition (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 549-553. While modern scholarship, principally
archaeological, has dealt with the question o f whether the Cirnbri were Gallic or Germanic, the traditional
arguments remain central. Tacitus is firm that the Cirnbri, who still lived in Jutland during the Flavian
period, were Germanic. The fact that they entered from “outside” Gaul seems to be the main suppoit of
their Germanic origin so exact identification is inextricable with Caesar’s paradigm.
40 As one puts it: “The Gafllil were bad enough; but now the conquerors o f the Ga[lli] were coming.”
Philip Van N ess Myers, A History o f Rome, second revised edition (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1917),

78.
26

“power and dominion of the Roman people” and which hosted “a citizen-colony, which
stands as a watch-tower and bulwark of the Roman people, and a barrier of defense . ..
there is also the city of Massilia . .. inhabited by brave and faithful allies, who have
found in the resources and rewards of the Roman people a recompense for the dangers
they have run in our Gallic Wars.”41 T hus, despite the near trauma suffered five decades
earlier, the frontier zone in Gaul was considered secure, without any contact with the
Rhine.
The concept of the frontier zone implies a level of continual interaction between
Rome and the inhabitants. Two important ideas characterized Roman attitudes to this
relationship. The first is that of the terror gallicus, a perceived fear of the Galli due to
their history of conflict with Rome.42 While the terror gallicus may not have
characterized the Republic continuously from the sack of Rome or the appearance of the
Cirnbri, the Romans did have a heightened concern for the northern frontier shortly
before Caesar’s command. In his rhetoric of 69, Cicero defended the “honor of the
Roman people” and proclaimed them beyond any mere fear of war.43 Six years later, his
speeches lacked this sense of superiority. In 63 B.C., the year of Cicero’s consulship,
41 Cic. Font., 5.12-5.13, transl. N. H. Watts, London, 1931. The military language - watch-tower (specula)
and bulwark (propugnaculum ) - in relation to the veterans’ colony indicates more than rhetorical flourish.
It is also a subtle hint that Roman valor had won little more than a fortified camp. The speech was given in
defense o f a Roman governor whose financial practices had upset the neighboring Galli. Cicero expresses
a confidence in Rome’s position and willingness to maintain it, openly challenging the Galli to take up
arms. For details on Massilia, see Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, 61, 90-100.
42 Elizabeth Rawson, “Religion and Politics in the Late Second Century B.C. at Rome,” in Roman Culture
and Society: Collected Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 155; Greg W oolf Becoming Roman, The
Origins o f Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 61. The
phrase is a modern one, apparently originating in the second century A.D. in an excerpt involving
Mithradates and his Gallic allies. Just. Epit., 38.4. It has recently been argued that the Gauls were not
especially feared because they did not threaten Rom e’s military or cultural supremacy, as demonstrated by
their frequent defeats. Cicero nonetheless employs them rhetorically several times, and it may be that the
so-called terror gallicus (a modern phrase) was stronger outside the aristocratic elite. Isaac, The Invention
o f Racism in Classical Antiquity, 4 11 -426.
43 Cic. Font., 31.49.
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Rome avoided yet another civil war with the failure of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. The
Allobroges. a Gallic group, had representatives in Rome to approach the Senate regarding
their debts to Roman creditors. The Catilinarians approached these delegates, but the
Allobroges exposed the conspiracy. Referring to this connection, Cicero darkly hinted at
the danger of the Galli in speeches to both the Senate and the citizen assembly, even
raising the possibility of a general uprising and a possible invasion.44 Caesar was a junior
member of the Senate during the conspiracy, so his portrayal of the Galli (see below) was
likely a response to a growing sense of ambiguity regarding them. Such ambiguity would
make sense if Roman society, or a significant portion of it like the Senate, perceived itself
vulnerable to foreign disruptions similar to domestic ones like the Catilinarians. The
Galli inhabited territory close to Rome and her provinces, and they had already invaded,
twice. Rhetorical bombast or not, the possibility of a third instance may have contributed
to an increased awareness of the Galli just prior to Caesar’s proconsulship.
Such increased awareness woul i also involve the second important idea of the
pax deorum (“peace of the gods”). This was the belief that divine favor expressed itself
in Rome’s strength and prosperity because of proper cult conduct and concern for moral
order. The dividends of Rome’s empire did not just include military victory, financial
gain, and unrivalled prestige, but increased poverty, slave revolts, civil wars, and the like.
The emotional environment created by these results led to a belief in a moral decline or
loss of tradition that was responsible for these disruptions.45 Like the terror gallicus, the
pax deorum may have originated as early as the Gallic sack of Rome in the fourth
44 Cic. Cat., 4.4. Cf. Cic. Font., 16.36, 21.49. In 69 B.C., Cicero proudly dares the Galli to offer a
challenge, while chastising his fellow senators for bowing to threats. In 63, he vehemently insists that a
war might come and it should be avoided.
45 Sail. Cat., 10-13.
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century, but the paxdeorum continually remained in Roman thought and rhetoric."6 This
idea is less important for the political context of the Gallic Wars (the connection between
religion and civilization will be discussed in Chapter Three), but requires mention
because it contextualizes the Roman views of autochthony and land ownership that will
recur throughout this study. The integrity of territory went hand in hand with its
inhabitants’ right to it.
In the Late Republic - A New Gaul
Material wealth had a downside, as it could, at least according to Roman
prejudice, lead to a sharp decline in military virtue and virility. The inhabitants of Gaul
were neither passive nor static between 121 and 63 B.C. They instead developed intimate
financial and commercial ties to the Roman world.4647 The groups within the frontier zone
also faced a social and political transformation that may only have been partially
complete by the time of the Gallic Wars. There are strong hints that property owners
were displacing warrior elites throughout much of Gallia and the frontier. The Cimbri
may have been so disruptive driving population off key pieces of land that prices
dropped, allowing more fortunate landowners to acquire and consolidate larger plots.48

46 The idea in Cicero’s speech centers around the testimony o f a Vestal Virgin, brought in defense o f the
ex-governor. For the peace o f the gods and fear o f the Gauls, see Rawson, “Religio i and Politics,” in
Roman Culture and Society: Collected Papers, 149-168; William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in
Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 118-122; Williams, Beyond the Rubicon,
152-166.
47 Strabo Geogr., 4.4.1; J.P.V.D. Balsdon, Romans and Aliens (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina
University Press, 1979), 66; Barry Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory o f Europe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 350-353. Strabo states that Gaul produces a considerable number o f swine, and is
a major supplier o f Italy. The inhabitants were also notable for their hunting dogs. The import o f choice
was Roman wine.
48 Stephen L. Dyson, The Creation o f the Roman Frontier (Princeton: Princeton Unviersity Press, 1987),
164-170. Cf. Strabo Geogr., 7.2.1. A story ran that the Helvetii, who had previously been a settled,
peaceful people, became inspired to warfare after encountering the Cimbri, who had grown conspicuously
richer due to war-spoils. It may be that the warrior aristocracy, which would have depended upon prestige
goods, was undercut by a land-owner’s ability to engage in commerce.
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Increased commerce with the Mediterranean, either over the Alps or via Massilia, further
fueled this consolidation, weakening the system of chiefdoms and the warrior aristocracy
that had previously controlled much of Gaul through an economy of prestige goods/9
The flourishing of profitable contact between the Republic and Celtica would have added
incentive for Rome to ensure Gallia’s stability. The suggestion of such disruption is
attractive because it explains an upsurge in inter-Gallic conflict, but also indicates the
motive for one group to invite the Germani into the region, as the Sequani may have
needed Ariovistus’ assistance against their more prosperous enemies, the Aedui..
The frontier system established in 121 B.C. gave Rome key allies (socios) in the
Aedui, who were already opponents to the weakened Arverni. The Aedui were by
Caesar’s time frequently feuding with their eastern neighbors, particularly the Sequani,
whose own territory abutted the Rhine. The aforementioned Allobroges, another eastern
neighbor, were also enemies to the Aedui, and Rome intervened on their side both in 122
B.C. and again during a second revolt in 62.30 The Senate decreed that responsibility for
the safety of the frontier and the Aedui rested with the proconsul of Transalpine Gaul
during the conflict, and Caesar cites this obligation during his exchanges with
Ariovistus.5, Unlike the other major actors in the Gallic Wars, Ariovistus did not have49*51

49 For an introduction to pre-conquest Gaul, see Anthony King, Roman Gaul and Germany (Berkeley:
University o f California, 1990), 11-33; Greg Woolf, “Regional Productions in Early Roman Gaul,” in
Economies Beyond Agriculture in the Classical World, Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient History
volume nine, ed. David J. Mattingly and John Salmon (London: Routledge 2001), 52. For the Roman idea
o f tribe, see Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire (Ann Arbor:
University o f Michigan, 1994), 189-190. For a description o f Entremont, a city of the Sailuvii quite close
to the Roman ideal, see Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, 65-66. Caesar typically describes the Galli in the BG by
calling them civitates, with its implications o f a legally organized community. This was by no means
typical (Cicero, for example, uses gentes), but underscores the fact that Caesar was operating within a
network o f existing political entities with their own interests and not a random horde.
30 Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, 70. The Allobroges were in Rome in 63 B.C. partly because o f this campaign,
as their debt to Roman lenders originated in the indemnity caused by their defeat.
51 Caes. B Gall., 1.35.
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any connection to previous wars in Gaul, he was a newcomer. The Sequani contacted
him sometime in the late 60’s to assist them in overcoming the Aedui. Ariovistus had
marriage ties to the Suebi, a large confederation east of the Rhine, and to the kingdom of
Noricum, an ally of Rome, making him a prominent leader and possibly a creditable
patron even in Roman eyes. Because of pressure created by Germanic movements, or
similar Gallic offers, the Helevtii began preparations lor a mass migration with some of
their allies in 62, while the Catilinarian Conspiracy and concern over Gaul was still
present in Roman minds. These events emphasize the critical point that the frontier zone,
thought secure in 69, was no longer so seven years later, let alone eleven.
The changes in both Rome and Gaul reached a head before Caesar was even in
position to intervene. Ariovistus made good on his promises to the Sequani, inflicting a
near-crippling defeat on the Aedui not long before March of 60, as one of Cicero’s letters
tells:
[T]he great thing just now is the Gallic war-scare. Our Aeduan brothers have
recently taken a beating, and there is no doubt that the Helvetii are up in arms and
raiding the Province. The Senate has decreed th at. . . ambassadors with full
powers be sent to visit the Gallic communities and try to stop them making
common cause with the Helvetii.5253
The Helvetii were nowhere near Roman territory, and Cicero may have confused
them with Ariovistus. Regardless, Rome’s first response was diplomatic, and it
worked.

The instigator of the Helvetian migration, Orgetorix, perished in a power

struggle, and the Helvetii disappeared from Rome’s immediate view. Orgetorix had
attempted to use his people’s migration to forge a power bloc and to that end had
52 Cic. An., 1.19, transl. E. O. Bailey, New York, 1920. Notably, this affair actually drew attention away
from land issues.
53 App. Gall., 16; Caes. B Gall., 1.35. Appian claims that Caesar “himself vot[ed] for” the amicitia with
Ariovistus. Caesar, perhaps predictably, does not say whether he did or not.
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established marriage ties to Dumnorix of the Aedui, and Casticus of the Sequani. 4 He
planned to lead the Helvetii and their allies through Sequani territory and join forces with
the Aedui, the strongest Gallic community. Cicero seems aware of some coming
resolution to the affair by June of 60 B.C.5
455 One key interpretation of these events is that
the senatorial decree to the proconsul was aimed against Ariovistus but Rome then allied
with him against the Helvetii.56 Certainly the Aeduan defeat, Casticus’ subsequent
downfall (Caesar never again mentions him), and Cicero’s assumption that the Helvetii
were responsible support the idea. As for Ariovistus, the Senate accepted him into an
amicitia (a less defined relationship than socios) by 59, during Caesar’s consulship,
bringing him into the existing diplomatic network.57 Insofar as the Romans could see, the
death of Orgetorix had prevented the Helvetii from disrupting the frontier and Ariovistus
had accepted an accord. By May, Gaul was so peaceful that Cicero could mock a
colleague for missing a chance at a triumph.58 The frontier remained *ntact, and the
Rhine was still not involved.
While the frontier system remained intact in 61 B.C., Rome’s northern security
was in a state of flux. The individuals of note during the period of the Gallic Wars and
later were in many cases reaching their pre-eminence. Caesar was campaigning as
proprietor in Hispania, while his future partner and rival Pompey was returning from his
successful eastern campaigns. It is not clear precisely when Ariovistus arrived in Gaul,
54 Caes. B Gall., 1.2-1.4. This background was important for Caesar because it elevated the threat o f the
entire frontier erupting into conflict, but also to foreshadow the involvement o f Dumnorix and the trouble
he would later cause.
55 Cic .An., 2.1.
56 Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest o f Gaul, 38-49.
37 For these issues, see A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, second edition (London: Oxford
University Press, 1973); Erich S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming o f Rome, volume one
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984).
58 Cic. Att., 1.20.
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or how much of an effect he had until the defeat of the Aedui.51 Some Galli had grown
rich and powerful through contacts with Rome, while others pursued more traditional
routes to leading status. For example, Dumnorix, whose personal retinue of cavalry
seems to have survived the Aeduan defeat, competed with his brother, the pro-Roman
druid Diviciacus, for influence within the Aedui. Diviciacus had apparently approached
the Senate for assistance after the Aeduan defeat.01' Dumnorix likely had the advantage
through his control over lolls and tax contracts because these sources of revenue provided
the cash to maintain armed retainers and to make loans.*601 Orgetorix’ death cost him one
connection to the Helvetii, but Ariovistus’ occupation of the Sequani compensated by
making Dumnorix their lone ally in central Gaul. Unfortunately, with Ariovistus
preventing travel through Sequani territory, the only way for the Helvetii to enter central
Gaul was by transgressing the boundaries of Transalpine Gaul in 58.62 Also in that year,
Rome’s proconsul of Transalpine Gaul learned of their approach, marched to meet them,
fortified the Saone, refused the Helvetii access, repelled their answering assault, and
marched after them. So began the Gallic Wars.
The Roman Frontier - War as Politics
The lead-in to the Gallic Wars makes three things clear. First, the theoretical
model of a frontier zone describes the strategic situation superbly.63 As Cicero’s letters

M! Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest o f Gaul, 553-554. The consensus view at Holmes’ writing was apparently
that the Germani entered Gaul around 71 B.C., although some argue as late as 61. The dating is a question
o f how literally to take certain lines in the BG. Ariovistus’ arrival is less important for this study than how
the Romans and Galli dealt with it.
60 Caes. B Gall., 1.39; Caes. B Gall., 6.12; Cic. Div., 1.41.90.
61 Caes. B Gall., 1.18. Diviciacus was supported by Rome. Caesar is not shy o f accusing Dumnorix o f
working against him, especially just before the second voyage to Britain in 54. Dumnorix was killed
attempting to escape the expedition.
62 Caes. B Gall., 1.10-1.11.
63 Dyson, The Creation o f the Roman Frontier, 136-173.
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demonstrate, the Senate was aware of occurrences within Gaul quite distant from Rome’s
own provinces, and there was concern for the fallen fortunes of her regional ally, the
Aedui. Second, the strategic situation was of an essentially political character. Rome’s
territorial boundaries were not breached (although Caesar noted the future likelihood of
this) nor were her citizens attacked, but the city’s dominion was upset. Rome dealt with
autonomous dependencies, but ruled through financial, political, and military obligations,
ties that two large migrating populations with martial reputations would alter. Either
population, Helvetii or Germani, would have transformed the comparative prestige,
wealth, and strength of the native communities, changing their relative positions, and
undermining Rome’s influence within the frontier zone.6465 Thus, Caesar’s pursuit of war
after taking office was to address this situation and to prevent destabilization.
Before turning specifically to the respective roles of Ariovistus and the Rhine in
the BG, Caesar’s own role deserves discussion. The Gallic Wars occurred at a time when
Rome awarded greater levels of power to individual delegates, with Caesar and Pompey
being the most important examples. The conflict was concurrent with their political
union and may have contributed to Rome’s breakdown into another civil war. This said,
the rise of Caesar’s fortunes within Roman politics due to his success in Gaul does not
directly concern this paper.63 A greater concern is Caesar’s typicality, or the extent to

64 The precise quality at issue is that o f dignitas. For an individual, dignitas generally indicates “honor” or
“reputation,” while collectively it has an association with influence. The Roman concern for it stems from
a belief that the quality summons respect and discourages attack. For a discussion o f dignitas in general
and related values, see J. E. Lendon, Empire o f Honor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), esp. Appendix I,
272-279; Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999), 15-23; Cic. Pis., 11.9, 24.57.
65 This is an element that Caesar himself does not emphasize (aside from when his grain supplies are in
danger) but modern commentators never fail to notice. For example, Strabo relates that the treasure of
Toulouse, a total o f 15,000 talents, was largely collected from lakes and that some suspected that this
wealth came from the Celtic sack of Delphi in the third century. Strabo, 4.1.13. Cf. Cic. Att., 5.17; Cic.

34

which his actions fit into the accepted sociopolitical role of a Republican proconsul. This
is an important issue precisely because the Gallic Wars did not initially involve either
Caesar or the Rhine. The governor of Transalpine Gaul was responsible for the security
of the frontier zone, and Caesar’s actions in Book One, indeed even the composition of
the BG itself, were consistent with that responsibility. Using Macedonia as his example,
Cicero asks:
Who ever held control of a province and its forces, and sent no single dispatch to
the Senate? Above all, when that province was so important and equipped with
forces so numerous [and] has such formidable barbarian tribes [gentes] upon its
borders [attinguit, to reach] that our Macedonian commanders have always acted
as if the limits \fmes] of their province were only those of their swords and
javelins.66
The role of provincial governor included two specific obligations that the Romans
expected the officeholder to fill. One was to keep the Senate informed of his activities,
and since the claims in these commentaries would suggest future honors, some
grandstanding was expected. Secondly, and critically, the governor was a military
commander responsible for protecting territorial integrity by campaigning against
dangerous groups at the edges of the province. Caesar’s own decision was to eject the
Germani from Gaul by using the Rhine as a landmark. Clearly, his actions are not totally
inconsistent with Roman expectations.
In broad terms, Caesar was a typical proconsul, since Roman governors were
predominantly military commanders and not administrators during the Republic. Aside

Fam., 7.7. Cicero advises his client Trebatus to do his best at making his fortune under Caesar’s command.
These letters are also significant because they demonstrates that, regardless o f why Rome went to a
territory, the Romans did expect to get something for the effort: “I hear that Britain has not an ounce o f
either gold or silver.” For the expropriation o f wealth in general, see P. A. Brunt, “Laus Imperii,” in
Imperialism in the Ancient World, ed. P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker, I h e Cambridge University
Research Seminar in Ancient History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 159-191.
66 Cic. Pis., 16.38, transl. N. H. Watts, London, 1931. The exact same circumstances existed in Gaul.
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from Caesar, only Cicero leaves an intact, personal account of his governorship during
the Late Republic. Cicero was proconsul of Cilicia in 50 B.C. and led at least one
campaign and siege. A fellow senator congratulated him on his administration of the
province, but refused to recommend a triumph/’7 Good rule was clearly not viewed with
the same credit as military glory. Provincial governors possessed a level of imperium
(“absolute authority”) equal to the highest magistrates of Rome, with the power to protect
Rome’s citizens, settle disputes between native communities (including the definition of
their territory), and to campaign independently according to necessity.61*68 Proconsuls
settled disputes and made treaties on their own authority, but their administration was
generally limited to appropriating resources, overseeing taxation, and collecting
indemnities.
The practical independence of governors occasionally caused Rome great
difficulty by causing inconvenient warfare or, worse, defeat, and it is important to view
the BG with this in mind.69 The key feature for the Romans themselves was success, not
motive, and it is tempting to see some connection with the pax deorum in this.70
Although the Rhine had greater significance in later books of the BG as a line between
61 Cic. Fain., 15.5. Cicero, who had little inclination towards military affairs, almost makes it seem that he
campaigned only because it was expected o f him. His correspondence is also interesting because it
suggests a haphazardness in Rome’s deployments: “You can take it from me here and now: at this time,
with this army, and in this place, just so much could be done.” Cic. Att., 5.20, transl. Dr. R. Shackleton
Bailey, New York, 1986. Cf. Brunt, “Laus Imperii,” in Imperialism in the Ancient World, 178, footnote
69, regarding Roman dispositions prior to the Gallic Wars.
68 Provinces had only gradually become associated with territory, and essentially consisted o f a task or
category for which the governor would be granted consular imperium. J. S. Richardson, Hispaniae: Spain
and the Development o f Roman Imperialism, 218-82 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),
4-5.
69 Since such poor judgment reflected badly upon senatorial class, these examples had great rhetorical
effect. Cicero, for example, pointedly passes over a string o f such examples prior to praising Caesar,
whose success apparently justified his actions. Cic. Pis., 21.50.
70 Nathan Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and
Late Republic l Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1990), 54-91. The sociological element o f pax
deorum involved removing blame from individual Roman aristocrats for unsuccessful campaigns.
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Germani and Galli. in Book One it was a simple political division between the Germani
of Ariovistus and the Sequani, to whom Caesar offered protection (see below). Caesar’s
proconsular imperium allowed him to simply declare the river the border, which would
make sense to Roman minds because bodies of water were customarily used for defining
large regions. '1 As his opening lines demonstrate, Caesar used rivers other than the
Rhine to differentiate one group’s land from another, but these were as much political
divisions as ethnic. In point of fact Caesar concentrates quite specifically on the Rhine,
especially once he begins his argument against Rome’s alliance with Ariovistus. The
nature of the division, at least in Book One, remains a political one.
Two Opponents - Helvetii and Germani
The narrative of the BG opens with the Helvetii, explaining Caesar’s activities in
terms of the threat they pose to the province and the Aedui. Specific mention of
Ariovistus does not occur until after the Helvetian defeat, in a meeting with the Gallic
leaders. The rhetorical goal of the BG becomes immediately apparent. Even as the
supposed danger is introduced, it is described in relation to another: “the Helvetii were . .
. leading to the rest of the Galli in courage, because they often fought daily battles with
the Germani, so that they both keep [the Germani] from their own territory and wage war
in [Germanic] territory themselves.”7172 As noted in the introduction, the Germani are
introduced as a group before the territory of Germania itself. In point of fact, Caesar
introduces the Germani as a frontier threat prior discussing them as a people who were

71

In 46 B.C., Cicero describes the provinces won by Caesar by their boundaries, the Rhine, Ocean, and
Nile, all bodies o f water. Cic. Scaur., 9.28. The Po River, for example, helped define Cisalpine Gaul. See
Nicholas Purcell, “The Creation o f Provincial Landscape: The Roman Impact on Cisalpine Gaul,” in The
Early Roman Empire in the West, ed. Thomas Blagg and Martin Millet (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1990).
72Caes. BGall., 1.1.
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trims Rhenum incolunt (“living across the Rhine”). The first chapter of Book One
introduces two tropes for Caesar regarding the Germani and the Rhine. First, he
emphasizes the alienness of the Germani with structures that underscore their belonging
elsewhere, in the process preparing his audience for his decision regarding the border of
the Galli, at the Rhine. Second, there were conflicting images of the Galli themselves, a
factor in Roman rhetoric as demonstrated by Cicero. The BG emphasizes the
development and sophistication of the Galli and not an elemental, barbarian image. The
Helvetii retain some of the latter, heightening the tension in the narrative, but through
their positive comparison with the Germani, Caesar’s principal target becomes clearer.
Caesar at length defeated the Helvetii outside the Aeduan capital of Bibracte,
resettling them in their old land with winter supplies from the Allobroges.73 “[Caesar]
did this for this chief reason, because he did not want the location which the Helvetii had
left to be empty, so that the Germani, who live across the Rhine [trans Rhenum incolunt],
would not cross from their territory into Helvetian territory for the good fields [honitum
agrorum] and be at the border \finitimi] of the Gallic province and the Allobroges.”74
This passage sees one threat handily eliminated while introducing a greater one. The
passage revisits the theme that the Rhine separated the Galli from the Germani. It also
indicates the prosperity and development of the Galli by mentioning the “good fields,”
suggesting that such resources (which the province possessed) invited attack. Third, the
passage makes plain the proximity of the threat. If the Germani crossed the Rhine, they

7’ The Helvetii had burned their property prior to migration. Caesar suggests that it was to prevent second
thoughts. It may in reality have been a sacrificial or cultic procedure or attempt to leave possible enemies
few chances for loot. Whatever the actual motive, the act fit into Roman ideals o f bravery, underscoring
the courage o f the Helvetti and thus that o f their enemies (both Germani and Caesar). Caes. B Gall., ! .5.
74 Caes. B Gall., 1.28, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996.
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would be abutting the territory of Rome and her dominion. The Helvetii had suffered a
major defeat and were therefore weaker than before, but Caesar’s victory had also left
them dependent and allowed him to act as patron (via the Allobroges). They had a right
to return to their own land, which had become included within the frontier zone.
With the Helvetian problem solved, the narrative turns to a convention of the
Gallic communities’ leading men.75 Caesar’s comparison between the Galli and the
German! begins in earnest with this council. The Galli requested the proconsul’s
presence to air their concerns, indicating their understanding of Rome’s place within the
frontier zone. At the meeting, Caesar acts as mediator among the various groups, from
investigating allegations against Dumnorix to outlining, in full, the Germanic issue. The
narrative does not describe the precise relationship of Ariovistus to Rome. The BG
instead explains his reprehensible behavior towards the Aedui and, by extension, Rome.
From this convention onward, the BG is replete with indications that Ariovistus could not
be trusted to respect Rome’s dignitas or her allies. As proconsul of Transalpine Gaul,
Caesar took it upon himself to settle the border dispute between the Galli and Germani
according to Rome’s best interests.
The Galli - Cowed Subjects under a Haughty Warlord
The Gallic convention is one of the BG's truly dramatic portions. Language
indicative of invasion, of crossing a static object or landmark, is also more common at
this point in the narrative, building upon the earlier comparisons between Helvetii and
Germani. Diviciacus acts as speaker for the Galli as they “all wept and threw themselves
75 Caes. B Gall., ] .30. The Gallic envoys asking for the meeting also acknowledge Caesar’s assistance to
them in defeating the incoming Helvetii. This may have been flattery, but more than likely was Caesar’s
own reinforcement o f the initial danger that brought him there. These communities were probably those of
Celtica only. Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest o f Gaul, 634.
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at Caesar’s feet.” He explains how “these wild and savage men [feri ac barbari] had
conceived a passionate desire for the lands of the Galli, their way of life, and their
wealth,” but notes that “a worse fate had befallen the victorious Sequani than the defeated
Aedui.”76 If any of Caesar’s audience suffered from terror gallicus, this passage seems
destined to shatter it, as it sharply contrasts a weakened but prosperous people and a
strong, dangerous one. The former sackers of Rome cannot only be conquered, of which
Cicero was confident in 69 B.C., but they were already so, as Ariovistus was showing.
The text describes their behavior {fluentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt) in the same
terms used for the defeated, and newly submissive, Helvetii (adpedes proiecissent. . .
fluentes) - both groups “falling to his feet, prostrated themselves.”7778 The Galli appear as
supplicants begging for the protection (and forgiveness?) of Rome. This portrayal
synergizes with the fact that Ariovistus, who once possessed relatively few warriors, was
continuing his people’s migration with a new wave of settlers. The Galli, once
numerous, have been cut down in battle (despite their ties to Rome) and suffered the
depredations of their assumed ally (also Rome’s). The Germani, meanwhile, continued
to grow in strength. Gallic fides, if not outright dependence, is juxtaposed to Ariovistus’
possible lack thereof.
Only their spokesman, the druid Diviciacus, seems unconquered, as he retained
his honor by not yielding to Ariovistus’ demands for hostages and an oath of obedience
to the Sequani.

If the Germani, personalized in their leader Ariovistus, are dangerous,

76 Caes. B Gall., 1.31, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. Their way o f life is another theme to
which Caesar will return, although he notes here “nor was there any contest between the two.”
77 Caes .B G all., 1.27.
78
These were traditional practices indicating submission and helped to maintain control over the defeated
power. Oaths and hostages were customary practices, and also the assurances of loyalty that Caesar tended
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the spokesperson for the Galli, Diviciacus, is depicted favorably. Diviciacus’ character
provides Caesar with a foil for Ariovistus. He remained true to his own status and his
people’s association to Rome by demonstrating the aristocratic virtue of honor. He had
petitioned the Senate for assistance, albeit unsuccessfully. As such, the text shows
Diviciacus to be as trustworthy as a Roman might be, and gives Rome’s proconsul ample
cause to settle the matter.
Caesar underscores the Germanic threat in his description of the damage to
Rome’s allies, which he gives in terms meant to suggest Rome’s own sociopolitical
hierarchy. Ariovistus, identified as the rex of the Germani, had toppled the Aedui by
killing or taking hostage their omnem nobilitatem, ornnem senatum, and omnem
equitation. These groups -- the nobles (descendents of consulars), the senators (landowners and junior magistrates), and the cavalrymen (the equestrian order) - formed the
basis of the Roman res publica.79 The repetition of omnem (“the entire”) reinforces the
comparison between the near destruction of the Aedui and what Ariovistus might do
against Rome in the future by making Ariovistus the enemy of every class, not just a
single party, in other words, Caesar’s argument against Ariovistus was not just that the
Germani were militaristic or ignored Rome’s interests, but that they endangered the
social fabric of Roman society and that of the frontier zone.

to demand (a third, indemnities, has a much lower profile in the BG). The intent here may be to portray
Ariovistus as usurping Rome’s position, not just in imitating her practices, but by making such demands
upon her allies. This would make sense, because hostages and oaths featured prominently in the practice of
deditio, which could have a ritualistic overtone and connection with the idea o f the pax deorum. The point
was not only to win, but to be acknowledged as the victor, with all rights to property and acknowledgement
o f the justness o f the war. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy, 217-219; Richardson, Hispaniae, 142-143.
79 In his defense o f Milo, Cicero mocks his opponent by anthropomorphizing society: “The Senate mourns;
the equestrian order is inconsolable; the whole community is bowed down with affliction; the
muo'cipalities wear the garb o f woe; the colonies are heartbroken; why, the very fields are pining. . . . ”
Aside from the elite, only the political unit counts. Cic. Mil., 8.20.
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After Diviciacus’ speech, the BG again displays the Galli as supplicants, and this
is especially true of the Sequani, who were worse off for joining with Ariovistus than for
opposing him. With the Germani “inside their territory” (intra finis suos), they cannot
escape from Ariovistus’ influence.

Caesar acted in proconsular fashion and agrees to

settle the dispute, offering the Sequani his patronage in the process.

O 1

He professed the

desire to employ his status to marshal a receptive hearing from Ariovistus while
reiterating the principal reasons for concern: close relations with the Aedui (fratres
consanguineosque - “brothers and family members”) who have suffered injury, the
growing number of Germani who continue to enter Gallia, and Ariovistus’ reported
arrogance. He also compared the contemporary situation and with the invasion of the
Cimbri and Teutoni, including a reminder of proximity to Roman territory.808182 This
comparison reinforces the earlier imagery of the supplicant Galli, especially the pathetic
Sequani, and further vilifies Ariovistus as being beyond his bounds.
In an earlier passage regarding the Helvetian migration, Caesar had characterized
the Rhone and the Rhine in quite different ways. While the Rhine was latissimo atque
altissimo (“very wide and quite deep”), the Rhone had non nullis locis vado transitur (“a
shallow place to cross in no few locations”).83 The use of superlatives to describe the
Rhine’s impassability contrasts with a double negative (non nullis, lit. “not none”) when
describing the traversable Rhone. The Rhone was also a major trade route, whereas
80 Caes. B Gall., i .32.
81 This constituted a perceived law, with the weak obeying the strong and the strong shielding the weak.
Patron client relations may have been eclipsed in Rome, but foreigners and provincials might still require
an agent within the Roman system. P. A. Brunt, The Fail of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1988), 390-421; E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, second edition (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1968), 15.
82 Caes. B Gall., 1.33. Marius defeated the Cimbri near the Po River, and Caesar notes that only the Rhone
stands between the land o f the Sequani and “our province” (i.e. Transalpine Gaul).
83 Caes .B G a li, 1.2, 1.6.
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Roman merchants had not had much dealing across the Rhine. Clearly, Caesar thought
(or meant others to think) that the Rhine was far more formidable than the more familiar
river. The Rhone was not especially defensible, at least for long, so the practical solution
was to pursue and engage the enemy. The Rhine was difficult to cross in the first place,
so it was crucial to prevent an established beachhead. Caesar therefore set out the danger
of an unrestrained Ariovistus before even encountering him. He credited Diviciacus with
making the suggestion that “in a few years they [the Galli] would all be driven out of
Gaul, and in turn all the German[i] would cross the Rhine.”8485 This theme of movement
across a fixed point is recurring - Rhenum transisse\ Rhenum transirenf, Rhenum
traducatur - and such language culminates after the speech: Rhenum transire el in
Gallium . .. venire (“[they] crossed the Rhine and came into Gaul”).8'’ The Germani had
not just attacked a people friendly to Rome, they were continuing to do so, and, above ail,
they had passed a known marker and come into Gaul. In other words, the danger to the
frontier aside, the Germani simply did not belong in Gallia. Caesar successfully casts
Ariovistus and the Germani as a group less trustworthy than the Galli, more terrible than
the Galli, and, completely unlike the Galli, in a place they should not be.
After the convention, Caesar began marching into Sequani territory, heading for
their citadel of Vesontio. Along the way, he exchanged several missives with his
opponent. From the convention to the onset of battle, the BG describes a chieftain in
every way worthy of the charges leveled previously, while Caesar continues to portray
himself as Rome’s champion and Gallia’s patron. Ariovistus did not respect Caesar’s
beneficio .. . auctoritate as Caesar had predicted to the Gauls. He proved arrogant,
84Caes. B G a li, 1.31.
85 Caes. B Gall., 1.33.
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cowardly, and dishonorable - Ariovistus would not come to Caesar when requested, he
would not come without an army, and he did not justify himself beyond the right of
conquest (ius belli).86 In other words, he would not act as a faithful (in fidem) ally
should. This series of exchanges follow s a pattern according to which Caesar and
Ariovistus explain their positions, only for the latter to prove intractable to the requests of
the proconsul to the point of attacking during the process. Caesar’s principle demands
are the restoration of hostages and property to the Aedui and for Ariovistus to stop the
flow of Germani into Gaul.87 Ariovistus’ reply in the first exchange, which takes place
through envoys, consisted of a show' of strength. Ariovistus questioned the right of
Rome’s proconsul to make such demands, as, operating under ius belli, the Aeduan
relationship with Rome could not protect ihem if they should provoke him.88 The
Germanic leader thus placed the exercise of might above and beyond the obligations
inherent within his relationship to Rome, obligations even the Helvetii had respected.89
Ariovistus indeed “had assumed such haughtiness as was not to be borne.”90
Ariovistus -- A Villainous Leader
Caesar’s rhetoric does not rely entirely upon character assassination. During the
march, messengers from the Aedui and Treveri reported the massing of Suebi along the

86 Caes. B Gall., 1.34. Caesar, o f course, ultimately drew his authority from the Senate and people of
Rome.
87 Caes. B Gall., 1.35; 1.43.
88 Caes. B Gall., 1.36.
89 Caes. B Gall., 1.7 (they awaited Caesar’s answer to their request for passage); 1.13 (they asked him to
provide a place to settle).
1Caes. B Gall., 1.33. The Romans required suitable respect for their honor, not just personal dignitas.
Mattern, Rome and the Enemy, 171-194.
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Rhine, with one of the Germanic leaders tellingly named Cimberius.91 The appearance of
these new Germani “proved” that Ariovistus did plan to invade, and at least suggested an
intended ambush for Caesar as well. The Roman forces nonetheless claimed the Sequani
oppidum of Vesontio before ihe Germani. Once there, the Roman officers almost staged
a mutiny, although Caesar managed to regain control quickly. The aborted mutiny was
not as important in itself as Caesar’s means of regaining control, his insistence that the
most effective defense against the Germani was Rome’s martial strength.92 The ability of
Rome to protect herself and her allies by meeting enemies openly in the field underscored
her place in the world (the pax deorum, at which Caesar hints) and demonstrated the
superiority of the Roman way of life. There was no greater expression of a people’s
moral virtue than the ability to face and defeat a foe in pitched battle, a standard which
the Germani had not met even in the defeat of the Galli (this will be discussed in Chapter
Three). Ariovistus apparently felt the same, “since he was now offering unasked what he
had previously refused to do when expressly requested,” and sought a personal parley
with Caesar.93
The face-to-face meeting marks the second time Ariovistus justified the Gallic
account of arrogance and undue destruction. With rhetorical flourish, Rome’s proconsul
again acts with consideration, while the supposed friend proves recalcitrant. Caesar again
expresses Rome’s superior position in the relationship, if in more diplomatic terms than
before, emphasizing the result of Roman custom and reiterating his demands. Rome’s

91 Caes. B Gall., 1.37. It is difficult to know, but it seems likely that this part at least was Caesar’s own
narrative invention. He could not know that he would be having much more intimate contact with the
Treveri and Suebi three years later.
92 Caes. BGall., 1.38-1,40.
93 Caes. B Gall., 1.42.
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favor leads to increased, not reduced, prosperity for those to whom it is awarded,
explicitly declaring that involvement within the Roman frontier was to the benefit of the
population.,4 Ariovistus brushes these concerns aside more dramatically than before, and
proceeds to act every inch the unworthy recipient and haughty king as he had earlier by
proxy.949596 This exchange ended after the Germani began to attack Caesar’s bodyguard,
prompting Caesar to withdraw. A second request to parley comes not long after, but
Caesar sends envoys instead of going personally. Although the narrative does not
identify this incident as an ambush, Caesar avoided dispatching any of his officers due to
safety concerns. The provincials that he did dispatch were promptly imprisoned.9'’ This
final charge of Ariovistus’ lack oifides, that he would violate the sanctity of envoys,
proved a moot point, as the armies set out on their respective maneuvering.
Caesar’s argument against the Germani entered its final stages during the face-toface meeting. The alien rex defended himself only to again turn to threatening Caesar:
he had crossed the Rhine (transisse Rhenum) when asked by the Galli; he was in Gaul for
wealth (spe magnisque praemiis) which he had won by iure belli and imposed as victor
(victores victis imponere); the Galli (omnis gallis civitates - “all the Gallic
communities”) had attacked him and he had won; they could try again, but could not
94 Caes. B Gall., 1.43.
^ Caes. B Gall., 1.44. Interestingly, Caesar gives Ariovistus a speech detailing inconsistencies in Rome’s
imperialistic behavior, in more general terms than the occasional passage criticizing the Senate’s sloth.
Although the criticisms are given in detail, Caesar brushes them o ff in reply. One scholar suggests that this
was a fairly common feature o f Roman literature, implying that the Romans were not concerned for the
morality o f their activities, at least in any universal sense. Isaac, The Invention o f Racism in Classical
Antiquity, 215-224. Dealing with another incident in Tacitus’ Agricola, Isaac concludes (221): “the reader
is left with the conviction that the accusations o f the enemy commander are true, but, in Roman eyes
irrelevant.”
9d Ariovistus claims to have a close connection, through messengers, with leading men in Rome, and thus
knows that killing Caesar would earn him favor. Furthermore, he attempts to dismiss Caesar by offering
himself as a proxy over Gaul. These claims, and the offer, are fraught with problems o f interpretation
beyond the scope o f this paper.
96 Caes .B G a ll., 1.47.
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claim peace without tribute (stipendium); he had accepted the amiciti[a] populi romani as
an ornamento el praesidio, non detrimento (“a distinction and a advantage, not an
injury”) so if he had to give up the tribute this particular “honor” would be worthless.
Ariovistus also addressed Caesar’s concerns, claiming the influx of settlers was for his
own protection and that he had a priori rights to Gaul anyway because of the invitation
and his martial success. Just as Caesar had extolled Rome’s role in increasing the
fortunes of her allies, Ariovistus proclaims its worthlessness, citing the failure of Rome to
aid the Aedui against the Sequani. He also questioned the support of the Senate for
Caesar.9, With the possible exception of his future imprisonment of the envoys, the
passage describing the face-to-face meeting presents Ari ovistus’ villainy, given a
foundation by Diviciacus at the Gallic convention, in its full splendor. Neither the honor
of Rome nor the authority of the proconsul would protect the frontier from the Germanic
chieftain.
The face-to-face meeting is the real culmination of Caesar’s argument. At this
point in the narrative, Caesar remains conciliatory and does not demand that the Germani
leave Gaul, merely that they stop coming over the Rhine into Gaul and that they restore
the property of Rome’s allies, the Aedui. Caesar appeals to his authority as proconsul,
which Ariovistus, an amicus, should respect. The chieftain must respect the decisions of
the Senate and Rome’s policy of strengthening her friends and allies, not looting them.
Ariovistus, however, recognizes only the only law of war (superior strength), and that it
is the place of the victor to dictate terms. Having defeated all the Gallic communities, he97
97 Ariovistus claims to have a close connection, through messengers, with leading men in Rome, and thus
knows that killing Caesar would earn him favor. Furthermore, he attempts to dismiss Caesar by offering
himself as a proxy over Gaul. These claims, and the offer, are difficult enough to prove, let alone Caesar’s
reasons to include them.
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gained full power over it regardless of any boundaries. Caesar’s explicit identification of
Ariovistus as rex may be a reference to Rome's own history of kings, especially given the
chieftain’s attack on the republican classes of the Aedui. Perhaps worst of all, Ariovistus
sought to subvert the honor that the Senate bestowed upon him for his own glorification.
He was not the type of leader that Rome could accommodate, nor, by extension, were the
feri ac barbari trans Rhenum incolunt (“fierce and wild peoplem living across the
Rhine”) that he ruled. As proconsul, a position with obligations both to protect regional
allies and to settle border disputes, Caesar could not accept such an uncontrollable force
within the frontier zone. Indeed, warfare commenced almost immediately after the
meeting. Regardless of the actual facts, Caesar’s argument that Ariovistus’ character,
and by extension his people’s nature, were undesirable and untrustworthy in Gaul
justified the only possible solution - total victory. This meant a Gaul free of Germani,
with the Rhine separating Gallia from these others.
Book One of the BG ends with the defeat of Ariovistus. The Germani, both those
facing Caesar and those (if any) further north, were driven away from the Rhine's banks.
Although Ariovistus survived the rout, the victory was decisive. Just as the Germani had
come trans Rhenum, news of their defeat also traveled trans Rhenum9* No more
Germani threatened to follow their predecessors for the time being, and Caesar departed
for Cisalpine Gaul. The Rhine River remained a marker for the finis of individual
groups, but its underpinnings as something more had appeared. With clearly dangerous
people living on the western side, the logical conclusion was that the Roman frontier
must include it, or else those groups which Rome relied on to buffer its actual territory98

98Caes. BGall., 1.54.

48

(and with whom she traded) would fall, as the Aedui and Sequani almost had. The
Helvetii may have been the most dangerous of the Galli, but they were still Galli. Once
defeated, they could remain within the frontier and possibly strengthen it. The Germani,
however, had demonstrated under, or because of, their king that they could and would
upset Rome’s dominion. The Gallic Wars did not end with Ariovistus’ defeat. Caesar
still possessed four years of his proconsular command, and, having discovered one
outside threat that could only be contained by enforcing Rome’s imperium up to major
waterways, he would proceed to bring as much of Gallia circum Celtica under the city’s
dominion as possible. For the next two years, he sought to complete this task of
preventing another external threat to central Gaul from injuring Rome’s interests. In 58
B.C, the Rhine, whose length Caesar had not yet measured, was a military and political
foundation for such stability.
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CH APTER THREE

SEPARATING THE RIGHT FROM THE LEFT
Modern scholars observe that “ignorance, not knowledge of the world which she
tried to conquer was most characteristic of Republican Rome.”99 Army campaigns were
the chief means of encountering and identifying new peoples and lands during the
period.100 Military commanders were typically of the highest social and political class,
members of the Senate who had held one of the higher magistracies in Rome. Caesar’s
proconsulship was unusual for its duration, initially five years, when the typical governor
would only serve for one year. These short tenures in distant regions did not aid the
gathering and dissemination of specialized knowledge because the governors were
chiefly commanders campaigning relatively close to their provinces, within frontier
zones. These elites campaigned partly for political purposes as a successful military
venture provided a significant boost to personal prestige and status.101 If anything, they

>9 N. J. E. Austin and N. B. Rankov, Exploratorio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World
(London: Routledge, 1995), 99-112. The Republican system o f independent, annual governors led only to
fragmentary information based on existing concerns. The consolidation o f territory into permanent
provinces during the Principate changed this by encouraging mapping and supported a semi-permanent
administrative staff. For this process, see Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early
Roman Empire (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan, 1994), 129-175.
I<x>Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley: University o f
California Press, 1999), 26-66. The Romans divided space via itineraries so the army was a major element
in “discovering” new nations and regions. The time traveled and the public spectacle o f the triumph was a
key way o f making them understandable to the Roman populace. On the other hand, tradition remained a
powerful force even in intellectual pursuits, so not everyone consistently pursued the most accurate
information in the face o f older ideas.
101 William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979), 21-26. Harris observes: “Through most o f the middle Republic about one consul in three celebrated
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concentrated on autobiographical accounts with ethnographic and geographic details
rather than systematic descriptive texts.
Caesar was of consular rank and the BG was intended to serve a public purpose
during his lifetime. Caesar set the Rhine as the boundary between the Galli and the
Germani principally to settle the frontier issues that drew him into Gaul in 58 B.C. There
was an ethnographic component in that the laws, customs, and language that he believed
split the Gallic peoples among themselves likewise separated all of them from their
eastern neighbors. The BG does not concentrate on these differences until later books,
and the text does not again concentrate on the Germani or the Rhine until Book Four.
Caesar’s negative portrayal of Ariovistus in Book One was not to disguise any
intent to cross the river himself in 58. Instead, the Roman army campaigned among the
more familiar groups surrounding Celtica, including in the Alps, over the next two years.
In 55 B.C., however, some Germani again attempted to cross the Rhine, this time further
north, around the territory of the Belgae.*102 Although Caesar had defeated some of the
Belgae soon after defeating Ariovistus, this portion of Gaul and its inhabitants were still
largely unfamiliar to Rome. In Book One, Caesar’s use of the river was political,
separating communities within the frontier zone from newcomers that he deemed
unreliable. This study now' turns to the BG's later books, especially Four, Five, and Six,
which describe the second phase of Caesar’s contact with the Rhine from 55 to 53 B.C.,
along its upper reaches. The peoples within northeastern Gaul were of a mixed nature,

a triumph, either in his consulship or in his promagistracy.” The circumstances o f the Late Republic were
different, o f course, but the triumph remained the premier way for an aristocrat to demonstrate his status.
102 Most o f the activity in the following three years takes place between the Seine and the Rhine rivers.
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typically Germanic in descent but Gallic in custom. The distinction between the two
peoples marked by the Rhine increasingly a cultural one.
This chapter will concentrate on how Caesar identified the peoples along the
Rhine from 55 to 53 B.C. The perceived features of racial and ethnic identity for Rome
of the Late Republic, and more specifically Julius Caesar’s perception of it, will be the
principal focus. This chapter contains two parts. The first is a general discussion of the
characteristics that Romans of the Late Republic considered significant in identifying
basic groups, or what a people were. The most basic characteristic, an assumed
autochthony on a fixed piece of land has already been introduced. The second part of this
chapter will study the specific characterizations of the Galli and Germani that Caesar
advances and the Rhine’s place within the paradigm. As will be shown, Caesar outlines
complex differences between the Galli and Germani in the later books of the BG in a
systematic description, an element absent from Book One. It will be argued that, having
decided that the Germani were too intractable, Caesar maintained his Rhine policy while
adapting it beyond a political context.
Cornerstone - The Gallic Community
The importance of the Galli in Roman history and political life has already been
mentioned, as has Rome’s entrenchment in Gallic territory. The roving war horde of the
fourth century B.C. was not Rome’s only experience of the Gauls by the mid-first
century. Gallic oppida such as Bibracte or Vesontio had evolved from hill-forts into
important trading and political centers, while most groups evidently organized oligarchic
governments rather than chieftainships. ' Commerce between the Roman world and*

l(b T. Riche Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest o f Gaul, second edition (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 504-505.
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central Gaul steadily increased from the second century B.C. on, bringing trade goods,
coinage, and ideas into the interior. The Galli nevertheless remained a prototypical,
barbarian foe, the very embodiment of the uncivilized enemy for several hundred years of
the Republic’s existence.104 Caesar combats this image in Book One with his portrayal of
the Gallic leaders when he begins his argument against Ariovistus, but the BG possesses
a strain of ambiguity regarding the Galli. Book One offered a significant point of
difference between the Galli and the Germani - as duplicitous as they could be, the Galli
could be trusted in fidem, while the Germani could not. Ariovistus had crossed the Rhine
into Gaul to war with the inhabitants, leading his Germani in a transgression of the
frontier zone in both its geographic and political aspects.105 Ethnicity - lingua,
institutes, legibus - played a small part in Caesar’s descriptions in his first three books.
Overall, however, his identification of peoples relied upon politics, namely their ruler(s)
and their relation to Rome, and geographical origin, expressed in the themes of
autochthony and migration.
Caesar’s proconsular activities did not rely upon any pre-existing distinction
between Galli and Germani, although Book One insists upon some disparity between
them. The proconsul operated amid civitates (communities), the individually organized
Gallic groups consisting of clients, cantons, and similar subdivisions. The use of civitas
to describe the Galli is significant because it indicates how Caesar visualized the state of
Gallic society: politically organized towns with associated fields and a social system
104 Sail. Cat., 7. Put into the mouth o f Cato, he calls the Gauls “the bitterest foes of the Roman people.”
For how the Rhine functioned as a border during the Principate, see Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography,
and Politics in the Early Roman Empire, 7-24, 189-190. Nicolet primarily discusses Agrippa’s map, one of
the earliest attempts during the Principate to precisely describe the known world through representational
units. This effort partly rested upon the connection between a land and its inhabitants, ties established by
lineage and custom, and was the culmination o f Republican thinking (itself derived from the ownership o f
land in Italy).
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centering on a public class of landowners, headed by prestigious offices, and unified by
laws and custom. This structure was akin to the body politic of Italy.'06 These political
and social characteristics were associated with settled agriculture, which was especially
indicative of civilization (humanitas - see below) to the Romans. Nomadism and
pastoralism, on the other hand, implied barbarity. Gallic oppida were politically and
economically central, and many of Caesar’s more dramatic battles were fought to control
them.

Once the site was held, the civitates was held, its aristocracy could be

accommodated, and Rome’s dominion could grow. Nomadic hunter-herder-bandits, like
Ariovistus, displaced the public class that patronized the settlements precisely because of
their mobility. They had no moral ties to the land through history or cult (discussed
below). The BG overwhelmingly speaks of civitates when indicating the Galli. In other
words, Caesar describes the Galli in terms of politically and legally organized
communities and not “tribal” units.
Common Latin words for foreign populations include civitas (community,
citizenry, etc.), gens (tribe, family, line, etc.), and natio (nation, people).*107108 Gens and
natio are often synonymous and both were used to describe unknown and “barbaric”

ll>6 A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, second edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1973),
5-25. Sherwin-White discusses the early development o f the Roman community, including its own
hybridized origins and the role o f affiliated peoples.
107 Notable battles included: Bibracte, the chief town o f the Aedui near where Caesar defeated the Helvetii;
Vesontio, the citadel o f the Sequani where Caesar defeated Ariovistus; Alesia, the decisive “final” battle o f
the entire conflict. The oppida represented sufficient collections o f surplus capital that the Gauls actually
could support Caesar’s troops during the winter months (a practice which was not well received, however).
For the role o f these settlements post-conquest, see J. F. Drinkwater, Roman Gaul (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983), 11, 141-143; Kevin Greene, The Archaeology o f the Roman Economy (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1986), 160-167; Barry Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory of
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 351-353. The Germani were not quite as migratory as
Caesar suggests, as their reported numbers should indicate. Furthermore, primitive oppida (Halistadt
period and earlier) exist well past the Rhine, but they did not develop to the point o f those in Celtica. These
sites are o f varying date, but all from well before the first century.
108 Chariton Lewis, ed., A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879).
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peoples, with natio being the less loaded word. While natio indicates that a group had
common characteristics or identity, gens strongly denotes blood relations, in terms of
lineage (clan) or physical stock (race). The Aedui, for example, were a civitas because
they had a distinct social order with leading men who formed a central authority for a
disparate group of people ranging from a noble like Dumnorix to a dependent like one of
his cavalrymen. The Aedui as a natio or gens would be a smaller group than the Aedui as
a civitas because those relationships could not be extended by membership, such as the
awarding of citizenship or acceptance as a client. The Romans identified their neighbors
within the context of their social and political system. What mattered were the group’s
relations to Rome, so the Aedui as a civitas would not necessarily consist of one ethnicity
but rather the shared identity of their elite - the nobles, senators, and equestrians. In
broader terms, identity of the Aedui as a people, rather than a community, depended upon
the fact that they were Galli. Explaining what the Galli were is not a priority of the BG,
but it goes into great detail to outline who they were.
That Caesar prefers civitas over gens when identifying specific Gallic groups does
more than dispel an old image of the Galli. It also places them at an intermediate stage of
“otherness” compared to the Romans. This otherness was more than simple geographic
unfamiliarity considering that Republican Rome was a ranked society. Social status
requires a social hierarchy, so membership in city-centered communities, civitates, was a
key component to Roman ideas of identity. Each community had a degree of prestige
and privilege that membership provided. In addition, membership was itself ranked, with
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full citizenship providing the highest level of rights to property or services."D Roman
law, for example, allowed various privileges to individuals based upon thetr level of
citizneship. One advantage of Roman citizenship was that it permitted full access to
Roman courts and shielded the possessor from abuse by magistrates, including
execution.*110 These types of privileges acted as checks on the imperium of officials and
could boost an individual’s status within their own community. Relationships between
communities had a similar hierarchy and included civhates sine suffragio, wherein the
community members had the honor of nominal inclusion, the status of socios (military
allies), and arnicitia, among others.11112 Regardless of the specifics of membership or
citizenship, the civitas was the source of political and social identity. By identifying the
Gallic groups as communities instead of tribes, Ca’sar explicitly acknowledged that they
had a place within these networks. An unaffiliated tribe (gens) might be a danger, but a
civitas had a distinct identity formed from their relationship to Rome spelled out either in
a treaty or by arrangement with a magistrate."2 The commonality involved in a civitas
was much more complex than one of lineage or breeding group. It was political and
social, giving the members an identity to outsiders and themselves, effectively saying
who they were.

I<>9 See Joyce Reynolds, “Cities,” in Administration o f the Roman Empire, Exeter Stuides in History No. 18,
ed. David C. Braud (Exeter: Short Run Press Ltd., 1988); Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 5-7.
110 In particular, Roman citizenship provided access to the law courts, rights regarding property (especially
contracts), and protections against some punishments. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome,
95-96; P. A. Brunt, The Fall o f the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 122-125. It also had
its disadvantages at times such as during the Midthradatic wars when he encouraged Mediterranean pirates
to harass the Romans specifically.
111 Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 165-169.
112 For the frontier, see Stephen L. Dyson, The Creation o f the Roman Frontier (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985), especially 45-62 (the Veneti in northern Italy), 136-154 (the Arverni in continental
Gaul); Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 20-25, 125-127.
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Perception - W ay o f life

If Rome in general and Caesar in particular dealt mostly with others on the basis
of rank, they were aware of the larger, more abstract element of identity. The Roman
worldview focused upon the past, making tradition the single greatest source of
legitimacy.113 Lineage and autochthony - a chain of descent in people and property were among the most important factors in defining what a group was. Both Romans and
Greeks sought the racial origins of the Gauls in ancestors or legendary figures and there
was little consensus regarding the differences between Gaili and Germani during the
Republic."4 Caesar consistently maintains a distinction in Book One, but does not
systematically outline it until Book Six. His Rhine policy was political for it separated
two groups based upon Rome’s interest and did not inherently involve the identity of the
people beyond their collective membership in terms of civitates. This was one reason to
equate a group and its leaders, or chieftain. Writing half a century later, Strabo, drawing
upon Posidonius, proclaims “these two nations [Germani and Galli], both by nature and
in their form of government, are similar and related to each other.”115 Caesar speculates
as to Gallic origins, but offers no good genetic difference between the Galli and Germani,
other than their respective occupation of territory relative to the Rhine.116 Other factors
had a minor role in identification as well, but usually served to distinguish between two
otherwise similar groups. The Romans were well aware that language, for example,
could be acquired. While one’s language or dialect could increase one’s prestige or
113 Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 149-161.
114 J. H. C. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 111-116.
115 Strabo Geogr., 4.4.2, transl. H. C. Hamilton, London, 1854. Strabo’s word for “nation” is the Greek
ethnoi, which is comparable to the Latin natio.
'16 Caes. B Gall., 6.18; Strabo Geogr., 7.1.2.
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status within a community, class, or faction, it did not override membership as the main
source of identity.117 Ariovislus spoke Gallic due to habit and not as a native, a detail
that Caesar carefully notes.118 The parameters emphasized in the BG are not physical
traits or even lineage, but rather cultural traits embodied in economic mode, political
organization, and custom.
Caesar continually stresses the difference in the lifestyles between the Galli and
Germani in the BG. He learned of Gallic colonies east of the Rhine and explains them as
remnants of past Gallic vitality (in spirit). He goes on to declare that those colonists had
become as if Germani and, therefore, were Germanic themselves:
But during an earlier period, when the Galli suipassed the Germani in courage
[ v//? m.v], and because of great population and a need for land, they raided beyond
[their borders] and sent colonies across the Rhine . . . [some of these colonists]
occupied and settled there . . . Now they endure the same helplessness, poverty,
and suffering in which the Germani remain. They possess the same living [victus,
probably “food,” but possibly broader] and clothing [culru corporis, “cultivation
of the body”]. The Galli, however, in proximity to the province, knowing many
goods from across the sea . . . The Galli gradually became accustomed to defeat
and were conquered in many battles so that they do not believe themselves
comparable in bravery with the Germani.119

117 J. N. Adams, “’Romanitas’ and the Latin Language,” Classical Quarterly (2003), 184-205. Cf.
J.P.V.D. Balsdon, Romans and Aliens (Chapel Hill: The University o f Carolina Press, 1979), 44-46, 136138; Brunt, The Fall o f the Roman Republic, 114-118; Elizabeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late
Roman Republic (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 19-37. Evidence points to a trend of
nativism within the senatorial class during the Late Republic, in which Caesar may have been quite
involved, see Lindsay G. H. Hall, “ ‘Ratio’ and ‘Romanitas’ in the Bellum Gallicum,” in Julius Caesar as
Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell
(London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998). Hall suggests that Caesar, much like Cicero, promoted a
genesis o f Latin material independent o f Greek models, and also speculates that his intended audience was
“middle Italy,” those o f some means outside the reigning political and social order that did not possess
access to Greek or other cultural material. Cf. Elizabeth Rawson, “Lucius Crassus and Cicero: The
Formation o f a Statesman,” in Roman Culture and Society: Collected Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1991), 16-34. Rawson suggests that Hellenism was tied to the Sullan faction, with Marians (such as
Caesar) promoting homegrown pursuits.
118 In dispatching his two final envoys to Ariovistus (after the face-to-face meeting), Caesar chose two
provincials, one o f whom was fluent in Gallic. Caes. B Gall., 1.47.
119 Caes. B Gall., 6.24. Caesar is specifically speaking o f the Volcae Tectosages and the Hercynian Forest.
While he does give some information on Greek knowledge of the specific group and their territory, he does
question the relation between the specific group and the more general comparison he is making..
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In other words, the inner characteristic (virtus) depended upon cultural factors and
material prosperity. Too much riches created the pathetic showing at the Gallic
convention, but too littie had two drawbacks. The superior Gallic bravery became
blunted by settling within new territory as the settlers, for lack of a better term,
degenerated away from their own fields. It nonetheless remained at a superior state to the
indolence that took hold of Gaul. The implication is that the two peoples, the Galli and
the Germani, were not biologically distinct (gens) but different ethnicities (natio at least,
civitas at best), defined not so much by lingua, institutes, and legibus (language, customs,
and laws) as prosaic issues of what one ate and wore. The common element for these
standards was political organization. The Galii organized themselves into civitates while
the Germani did not. A civitas relied upon wealth, which meant agriculture, the
traditional pastime of Rome’s elite.120
Agriculture consumed the Roman aristocracy to such a degree that one of Rome’s
earliest literary fashions revolved around agricultural treatises, one of which specifically
denied the equality of livestock with actual cultivation.121 Unsurprisingly, the Roman
elite viewed their own values as the standard of civilization, which is to say that
humanitas (civilization, culture) stemmed from urbanitas, respectable agriculture, and
similar qualities.122 The values of the Roman elite originated in the management of

120 Cic. An., 1.16. Cicero describes the trial o f Clodius, whose jury was untrustworthy primarily because o f
their vulnerability to bribes (which occurred) due to poor character/fmances. He also compares the honest
men with the robbers. The latter category largely consisted o f recipients o f the dole who depended upon
others for their livelihood, thus draining, not supporting, the public realm.
11 Keeping animals does not grow crops, and the growing o f crops on estates was both artful and a science
that could (with good land and in pleasing climate) provide happiness and security. Varro Rust., 1.2-1.4.
122 Greg Woolf, Becoming Roman, The Origins o f Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 55-59. Cf. Cic. Fam., 3.8. In his letter, Cicero mentions in passing that urbanem
(“culture”) has replaced sapientem (“common-sense”) in aristocratic parlance. While probably an ironic
joke, it still testifies to the value in fashion.
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property and expressed itself in the public realm where an individual was judged for his
conduct while acting as a model for others. The public nature of conduct underscored
Roman thoughts on morality and civilized behavior, especially libertas, the political
freedom offered by citizenship to compete with peers for regard and status.

Liberty

consisted of the right to speak publicly in favor of political activities, including matters of
peace and war.1231241256 Liberty in turn was won and kept by those brave enough to maintain
and defend the public realm as a whole, the public realm itself being an aggregate of
property owned by the brave.123 Humanitas was theoretically obtainable by any people
who adopted the civitas and mores necessary for this system. In a legal argument, Cicero
claimed civilized beings (doctis, those having been taught) were ruled by reason while
barbarians responded to necessity, and humankind as a whole, gentes, was ruled by
custom, mos. ~ The mores as a whole depended upon age for respectability, propriety
for validity, and the virtue of character. Qualities of note included honoring one’s
ancestors by following their example, providing due to the deities through proper cultic
practices, and the courage to defend one’s own property, and thus the collective property
of one’s countrymen, on the battlefield. Overall, the Romans of the Late Republic
perceived civilization as an acquired characteristic.

123 Cic. Pis., 16.37. Libertas is used metonymically for citizenship. Caesar often explains Gallic
motivations in terms of concern for their own liberty, which may have indicated an underlying respect for
them in that they were not “natural slaves” o f certain Greek theories. See Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of
Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 414.
124 P. A. Brunt, The Fall o f the Roman Republic, 296-297, 328-239, 349-350.
125 Sail. Cat., 6.
126 Cic. Mil., 11.30. The context o f the argument involves political violence. It has been suggested that
Cicero’s paradigm was a matter o f political effectiveness. Luxury and servitude, which brought inevitable
deterioration, could lead to the moral improvement o f some. This improvement was not equality but
advancement to an intermediate position o f worth with credit for the change going to the state and those
controlling it. Isaac, The Invention o f Racism in Classical Antiquity, 87-89, 184-186.
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By explicitly and continually describing the peoples of Gaul in terms familiar to
the Romans, Caesar identified the Galli as participants within the res publico. With
Caesar as patron, their greater development would become recognized, heightening their
status within Rome's eyes. Meanwhile, the negative image could go to the people
juxtaposed to the Galli, the Germani. The appellation of “barbarian" was the most
negative expression of a people in Latin. The BG employs it rarely and almost never to
refer to the Galli.127 If barbarian meant uncivilized in habit and custom, then Caessar’s
usage is consistent w-ith a Gaul not too different from Italy.128 Their fides - the Galli’s
adherence to the obligations inherent within their relationship to Rome - was also a
factor. By accepting diplomatic relations with Rome, the Galli accepted obligations to
provide resources and to accede to the “power and dominion of the Roman people."129
The Galli had proved dutiful in Book One and Caesar takes pains not to portray them as
otherwise.130
Lest it seem disingenuous, Caesar’s use of civitas likely came naturally because
of real characteristics of the Gallic population. The archaeological record clearly shows
that the Galli did possess a way of life similar to that of the Mediterranean in the first
century. Their settlements, oppida, were centers of economic activity, fcr both local

127 Caes. B Gal!.. 1.31, 1.33 (both describing Ariovistus); 1.40 (the Germani); 1.44 (Ariovistus, evidently
meaning ‘ignorant’); 2.35 (the Germani); 4.10 (referring to insular peoples); 4.17 (the Germani); 4.21 (the
Britons); 4.22 (Galli calling themselves barbarians as an excuse); 4.23, 4.25, 4.34 (the Britons); 5.34 (the
Eburones, a group o f Belgae, in the context o f guerilla tactics); 5.54 (Galli, evidently meaning ‘rebellious’
or ‘belligerent’); 6.10 (the Suebi, evidently meaning ‘ignorant’); 6.29 (the Germani); 6.34 (the Eburones, in
the context o f guerilla tactics); 6.35, 6.37, 6.39-6.41 (the Germani). This survey is not exhaustive, but it
demonstrates the various connotations o f the word as well as Caesar’s reluctance to use it for the Gaili.
Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, ! 11-128. The traditional Republican image o f the Galli in the second
century B.C. was nomadic. They represented the untamed wilderness opposed to the Greek (and Roman)
lifestyle o f ordered communities. This stereotype remained into the Principate, even for Roman citizens,
but without its intellectual validity.
129 Cic. Font., 5.12.
130 He nevertheless often cautions about the excitability of the Galli, for example: Caes. B Gall., 2.3.
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production and long-distance bulk trade.1' 1 Property owners, with Equestrian friends in
Rome to provide loans, could challenge traditional chieftainships based on prestige goods
and raiding for political power. ' “ Gallic manners were becoming more urbane, with
some, such as Diviciacus, being especially close to Rome. Others, like his brother
Dumnorix, continued to adhere to the o'der style, and these chieftairs gained less from
contemporary ties with Rome. In short, the Galli of Celtica in 58 B.C. were civilized
under the Roman paradigm, t he migrating Germani were not. A political border at first,
the Rhine would become an ethnographic dividing point during the second phase of
operations, beginning in 55.
Caesar might have thought well of Gallic sophistication, but he thought poorly of
Gallic character. According to the BG, the Gauls were “impulsive and sudden in their
decision-making,” “quick to take decisions and even eager for political change,” and
never forgot their “ancient reputation for war.”1312133 If one accepts Caesar’s basic portrayal
of Gallic divisions, such as those described in the convention of Book One, Caesar’s
decisions make political sense. His campaigns generally settled matters within Gaul.
From 55 to 53 B.C. Caesar campaigned on either side of the Upper Rhine, repeatedly at
odds with hybridized groups like the Eburones (Belgic) and the Treveri. This second
phase of Rhine activity included a major revolt by the Treveri and their allies in the
winter of 54 that was one of the most dangerous potential setbacks during the Gallic
Wars. This revolt, shortly before the more famous Gallic uprising led by Vercingetorix
131 Cic. Font., 9.19; Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory o f Europe, 429. The effect o f this, of
course, was that Rome could conquer people who reiied upon specific sites for defense, and integrate
people who might aspire to similar municipal positions.
132 Dyson, The Creation o f the Roman Frontier, 164-170.
133 Caes. B Gall.. 3.8, 4.5, 5.54, transl. Caroiyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. The difficulty o f maintaining
pro-Roman rulers is a subdued but recurring theme.
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(in 52), consisted of those "the furthest away from the civilization and culture of the
province."134* In other words, the utility of Caesar’s identifications was tested in similar
circumstances to their creation. Ideas related to lifestyle, origins, and martial strength
would intersect with Caesar’s use of the Rhine to make it an ethnographic division.
Caesar and the Rhine - Intervening Years
If the campaign against Ariovistus saw the creation of the Rhine policy,
subsequent events cemented it. Caesar continued to secure the frontier zone by
campaigning against border peoples other than the Germani. Caesar moved his men into
winter quarters within the territory of the Sequani and personally departed for Italy, as he
had other responsibilities there. Most commentators see his garrisoning of troops within
Gallic territory, rather than the province, as a provocation to the Belgae, the inhabitants at
the further end of the area.133 Some argue that this and his subsequent campaigns were
due to Caesar’s personal ambitions for a second consulship in Rome, and that the BG's
characterizations of the Gauls reflect Caesar’s pretexts for further involvement.136137 If
Caesar was acting in typical proconsular fashion, he would seek a deditio from each
belligerent group, and establish explicit ties with any others, in effect expanding the
frontier. '

The motive for wintering in conquered territory was likely to secure the

134 Caes. B Gall., 1.1, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996.
L'5 Caes. B Gall., 1.54-2.3. Caesar gives several for the Belgic revolt. Perhaps most significantly, Caesar
notes that the Belgae were stirred by Galli who did not want Rome to threaten them like the Germani did
(and again inclusive language: “Germanos . . . in Gallia”)- In other words, he implied a frontier threat.
136 Jane F. Gardner, "The ‘Gallic Menace’ in Caesar’s Propaganda,” Greece & Rome (October, 1983), 181189; for a more cultural view, see Louis Rawlings, “Caesar’s Portrayal o f Gauls as Warriors,” in Julius
Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton
Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998).
137 In this respect, the Gallic Wars appear almost a microcosm o f Roman imperialism in general, as "some
real but not very formidable dangers to its outlying possessions, [caused Rome to react] with such force
that not only were these possessions secured but extensive and valuable new ones were acquired.” Harris
War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 211.
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frontier against further attack and ensure the integrity of the Sequani, as they occupied a
roadway into Gaul. Whether, as Caesar claimed, his campaign against the Belgae was
pre-emptive, even a victory against some octhem made the frontier more secure by
discouraging interference with Caesar's dispositions. The Rhine does not feature as
prominently in Book Two as Book °oe, but its evolution into an ethnographic
determinant began with the challenge of the Belgae.
Caesar’s new opponents had several characteristics of note. They were a people
of Germanic descent that had occupied their territory generations before and were
remembered for having repelled the Cimbri.1 The Belgae were hybridized in that they
had mixed identities with a Gallic way of life yet clearly of different lineage than the
frontier zone Galli. The political nature of Caesar’s distinction again appears after the
defeat of one of the Belgic civitates in the field against Caesar in 57 B.C. At Diviciacus’
urging, Caesar showed leniency to the Bellovaci at least partly because “the Bellovaci
were forever faithful and on friendly terms with the community of the Aedui (Bellovacos
omni. tempore, in fide atque amicitia civitatis Haeduae fuisse)."1'9 The important factor
for the proconsul was the web of relationships tying the frontier peoples to Rome, and
diplomatic attachment to the Aedui could trump ethnic or racial attachment to the Belgae.
This campaign had a benefit for Caesar as well in that he could employ his patronage to
make the Belgic Remi a second pillar of Rome’s security in Gaul.
Caesar’s second year ends so successfully that he feels secure in rebuffing envoys
from across the Rhine, whom the Belgae evidently courted: “The fame of this war spread1389
138 Caes. B Gall., 2.4. The recall o f the Cimbri on this occasion emphasizes the Belgae’s strength, which
becomes explicit with the list o f peoples and soldiers that follows it. The inventory (2.5 ) is atypical for the

BG.
139 Caes. BGall., 2.14.
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among the barbarians [ad barbaros - those outside the frontier, likely the rest of the
Belgae], and was so impressive that the peoples living on the other side of the Rhine
[nationibus . .. trans Rhenum] sent envoys to Caesar; they promised to send hostages and
t >obey his commands.” 1*° The following year (56 B.C.), there was a brief struggle with
communities in the Alps over the passes into Gaul. Caesar afterwards thought he “had
every reason to think that the whole of Gaul had been subdued.”

The Acquitani, living

southeast of Celtica, were the final group on the fringes oi ne frontier to pose any sort of
threat, so Caesar returned to Gaul even as his legati did most of the campaigning. This
would be his last attempt to leave as he decided to secure Britannica next.140142 In 55,
however, the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine, drawing Caesar back to that part
of Gaul.
Phase Two - The Rhine Policy Revisited
There are two specific events discussed in the BG where Caesar concentrates on
the contrast between Gallus and Germanus. The first is his campaign against Ariovistus,
which led to the creation of his Rhine policy. After departing the convention of the
Gallic leaders, Caesar conducted forced marches to the fortified city of Vesontio in
anticipation of Ariovistus’ advance. Once there, his legati —those young men of good
birth, high class, or close friendship who sought political ties or advancement through
military experience - nearly sparked a mutiny. They panicked after hearing traders and

140 Caes. B Gall., 2.35, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. Whichever group this incident refers to,
Caesar seems to consider this moment the end o f any direct threat to the frontier.
141 Caes. B Gall., 3.7, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996.
142 Caes. B Gall., 4.20. The trip to Britain seems to be somewhat opportunistic, a consequence of his
fighting with the Veneti. Somewhat confusingly, Caesar claims that Britons aided his enemies (which
would fit with his duty to ensure frontier security) while also saying that the Galli knew little about the
island. Strabo suggests that Caesar sparked the conflict by endangering the Veneti trade monopoly. Strabo
Geogr., 4.4.1.
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the Sequani described the strength, size, skiii, and bravery of the coming Germani.
Caesar shamed the army as a whole into holding firm, largely by emphasizing the
superiority of valor (especially Roman virtus) over the lesser quality of cunning, which
had been enough to defeat the Gauls.143144 This lesser quality, possessed in abundance by
the Germani, did not indicate humanitas as valor did, perhaps because it lacked the
connection to property and the moral fiber of those willing to defend it (and thus the
state). The mutiny not only let the BG emphasize the ultimate military virtue of Romans,
it also added to the characterization of the Germani as chaotic bandits. They might be
strong and skillful, but they did not have the military virtue of Rome or even the Galli.
The proper, valorous way to fight was in pitched battles facing the enemy - virtus was
important because it was the spirit to stand one’s ground in a thunderous and bloody
melee, flight from which could be suicidal.145 The Helvetii fought openly, in a phalanx,
as did the Belgae and others with sufficient bravery to defend themselves and their
propeHy.146 Although Caesar consistently claims that the fighting spirit of the Germani
was the greater, theirs was the quality of fierceness (feri).
The second incident, the arrival of the Usipetes and Tencteri, pulled Caesar back
to the Rhine in 55 B.C., which would remain his principal theatre of operations for the
next two years (excepting his expeditions to Britain). It is worth reemphasising that
143 Caes. B Gall., 1.39.
144 Caes. B Gall., 1.40; Sail. Cat., 37. The Romans generally equated martial character, especially valor,
with moral worth. They were proud of their willingness to assist their allies ( socii), form military pacts
(foeda), and avenge their friends (anticitia).
145 Nathan Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi; Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and
Late Republic (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1990), 95-132.
146 Polybius describes the Celtic infantry as fighting naked or with a light cloak, as does Tacitus the
German infantry. Caesar describes both the Helvetians and Ariovistus’ Germans as fighting in a phalanx ~
a well-ordered formation o f Greek origin that must have been universal in Gaul by that time. There appears
to be a clash o f images, horde versus army, which spans at least two and a half centuries. Polybius is the
most detailed and the earliest. See Polyb., 2.28-2.29.
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Caesar was the first Roman governor to campaign beyond the groups of Celtica. Within
the frontier zone, Caesar operated within an established web of ties with many of the
groups - the Aedui and Aliobroges, in particular - who had long standing relations with
Rome. In the expanded campaigns around Celtica, he strengthened Rome’s position by
patronizing the Remi, forging another pillar to support an expanded frontier zone, and
supporting various leaders in other civitates. One of the stronger groups in northeastern
Gaul, the Treveri, were not as easily won over. They had allies of their own and like the
Sequani occupied territory adjacent to the Rhine. The Usipetes and Tencteri, entering
Gaul either because of invitations by the Treveri or possibly pressure from the Suebi,
were initially willing to come on Rome’s terms, much as the Helvetii had offered. Caesar
rejected the Germani’s offer as he had that of the Helvetii, although he made a more
complete example in 55 with his total massacre of these newcomers in a surprise
attack.147 The arrival of the Usipetes and Tencteri sparked a renewed focus on the Rhine
and the peoples near it that would culminate in a systematic attempt to distinguish
between Gallus and Germanus.
As proconsul, Caesar possessed the authority to carry war as far as necessary to
ensure Roman security and dominion. The matter of the Usipetes and Tencteri convinced
him to stem the flow of Germani by crossing the Rhine himself: “now that he had seen
how easily the German[i] were induced to invade Gaul [ut in Gallium venirent], he

147 Caes. B Gall., 4.13-4.15. He stuck to his Rhine policy (4.8): “there could be no friendship between
them and himself if they remained in Gaul.” The campaign against Ariovistus had been politically
difficult, but Caesar’s slaughter of the migrants, whether out o f ambition (he was preparing to invade
Britain) or as an example to other groups, evidently brought home more criticism. His excuse, that they
broke the truce first with a cavalry raid, has not generally been accepted. See Anton Powell, “Julius Caesar
and the Presentation o f Massacre,” in Julias Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as
Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd.,
1998).
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wanted them to experience fear on their own account - when they realized that the army
of the Roman people was both capable of crossing the Rhine and brave enough to venture
it.”14814950 Caesar emphasizes the security problem through his pursuit of the surviving
Germanic cavalry, whose continued existence made the victory (and massacre)
incomplete.140 In accordance with Roman dignitas, Caesar decided not to cross by boats,
a means typical of his opponents, but by constaicting a bridge - a monument that could
demonstrate Rome’s ability and willingness to take war to the enemy anywhere the
enemy called home.1'80 The invasion lasted several days, but Caesar withdrew after
inflicting little damage, largely due to reports that the Suebi were gathering.181 He would
similarly withdraw from Germania in a second campaign during the revolt of the Treveri
and their allies two years later while blaming supply problems.152
These Roman counter-invasions highlight two important facts. First, Caesar
revisited his Rhine policy in 55 B.C. partly because of the similar circumstances to those
in 58, with the political character of the frontier being of considerable importance.
Caesar encountered one Germanic group in his forays across the Rhine which acquiesced
148 Caes. B Gall., 4.16, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. It is notable that Caesar does not describe
the territory he is entering as Germania, and his envoys demand the surrender of those whom had attacked
“himself and Gaul.”
149 The practice o f eliminating all belligerents one way or another was typical. In the Gallic War o f 125121 B.C., for example, the conflict grew to include the Allobroges specifically because they aided Rome’s
enemies.
150 Caes. B Gall., 4.17. The invasion apparently had the desired effect, as the Treveri could not attract any
Germanic support in the next year when the real conflagration began. For Caesar’s manner o f fighting, see
Adrian Goldsworthy, ‘“ Instinctive Genius’ The Depiction o f Caesar the General,” in Julius Caesar as
Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell
(London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998).
151 Caes. B Gall., 4.19. transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. “(TJhinking he had advanced far enough
to serve both honor and interest. . . ” He ravaged the countryside, to little more than perhaps psychological
effect. Cf. Strabo Geogr., 7.2.1; Malcolm Todd, The Northern Barbarians 100 BC - AD 300 (London:
Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975), 112-116. Ancient authors sometimes imply that German villages consisted
o f nothing but wagons. Archaeological studies have demonstrated “enduring communities” but confirmed
a significantly lower concentration o f people and buildings in areas immediately to the west o f the Rhine.
152 Caes. B Gall., 6.29.
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to his patronage. The Ubii were by their own admission of Germanic lineage and lived
east of the Rhine, but because they accepted Caesar’s authority and gave hostages during
his first invasion he treated them as friendly parties in both invasions. Any group that
accepted the commands of Rome’s representative ceased to be a frontier threat. The
second fact revolves around military virtue. Caesar may have withdrawn in 55 because
he found little to fight over - he mentions “inciting fear in the [offending] Germani” and
accepting offers of friendship from others, but departs when learning of more gathering to
attack. '' He almost certainly withdrew in 53 to avoid a repeat of his experiences with
the Eburones during the revolt of 54. These experiences included grueling irregular
warfare for which the Romans were ill-equipped - the quintessential “barbarian” tactic of
relying on cunning and not courage. Instead of forming his lines to allow the scattered
enemy to pick off individual soldiers, Caesar moved cautiously and kept his forces in
loose groups - “Caesar preferred to overlook a chance to inflict injury . . . rather than
inflict it but do some harm to his soldiers in the process.”1™ In neither case did Caesar
advance into a potentially disastrous and unnecessary engagement with the Suebi. The
Rhine policy was always centered on maintaining control of Gaul and not on fighting the
Germani. Roman forces would fight to protect or expand Rome’s interests, but unless the
Germani crossed the Rhine or formed a proper battle line Caesar apparently had other
priorities.153*

153 Cues. B Gall., 4.17-4.19.
1,4 Caes. B Gall., 6.34, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. This passage offers one of the few
instances where the BG measures the value o f one group directly against another. Caesar defeated the
Eburones by calling for Gallic reinforcements to attack their territory while they kept him on the defensive:
“In this way the lives o f Ga[l!i], rather than those o f legionary soldiers, were put at risk in the woods.”
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Civilization - Degrees of Difference
The BG includes descriptions of peoples and customs throughout its narrative, but
the concentration of such material increases in the later books (Four, Five, and Six) when
Caesar is almost always in less familiar territory. Specialists like Strabo might employ (if
not accept) general “racial” categories originating in a theory of climatological
determinism, in which case the Germani were viewed as larger, fiercer, and ruddier than
the Galli, yet otherwise much the same.155 The peoples of the colder northern zone were
perceived to possess limited intelligence, impulse control, or craft ability, and tall frames,
pale faces, and deep voices.156 A people’s perceived mores was another standard, and
orators might concentrate on racial stereotypes that drew from a fairly common set of
negative qualities.'57 In either case, the new people would be known in some basic sense
that implied a distinctiveness of physical form and general habit. Distinctiveness in
whatever sense might attract the interest of the intellectual gentry with the promise of
quaint customs or an unusual pedigree.158 The BG was a rhetorical document and its
overwhelmingly political focus reflects Caesar’s concern for his relations to Gallic
groups upon whom he was at times reliant for material support.

155 Strabo Geogr., 4.7.2. The belief that environment determined some characteristics o f the native peoples
remained dominant throughout Classical times. The Mediterranean was o f course the best, allowing them
(especially the Romans) to have the most effective balance o f strength and intelligence.
156 Balsdon, Romans and Aliens, 60; for the Galli, see Strabo Geogr., 4.2; for the Germani, see Isaac, The
Invention o f Racism in Classical Antiquity, 427-439. Strabo implies the theory in his overarching
description o f the Galli, whiie Isaac argues that, through Roman history as a whole, the Germani are the
archetype o f the northerner.
157 Cic. Scaur., 17.33. One o f the more scathing descriptions o f provincials, Cicero makes frequent uses of
stereotypes such as untrustworthiness, complacency, and similar. Although his principal subject is Sardinia
(he is defending his brother, Quintus, from charges o f corruption), he compares the “national character” o f
several groups.
158 Cic. Q Fr., 2.16, transl. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, New York, 1986. Talking about Britain to his brother,
Cicero says: “You evidently have some splendid literary material - the places, the natural phenomena and
scenes, the customs, the peoples you fight, and, last but not least, the commander-in-chief!”
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The Gaiii were ultimately those peoples in Gaul, and Gaul was in turn the region
inhabited by Galli. Although circular, such close association fit into Roman ideas of
autochthony. A group inhabiting a piece of land for an extended period of time would
possess legitimizing cultural traditions that connected the public order with their
ancestors. The idea of the pax deorum was in this vein because the chain of ancestors
would inspire the best men, those land-owning aristocrats who had property to defend
and the virtue to do so, to follow their example in all custom.., including the proper cultic
conduct which pleased the gods and brought prosperity. The social and political system
embodied in the civitas, its economic foundation, and the connections between
communities all indicated a moral order best realized by continuity in mores. Cicero, for
example, insisted that:
Nor indeed can any man think otherwise, unless there be any who thinks that
there is no such thing as divine power and control, who is not stirred by the
greatness of our empire or . . . by the wisdom of our ancestors, who themselves
paid strict observance to worship and rights and auspices, and have handed them
on to us their descendents.159
For Caesar, the test was not actually descent - the Belgae, Treveri, and others
were of Germanic pedigree and Caesar was aware of Gallic communities in what he
identified as Germania. The key was the perceived way of life. West meant Gallia,
agriculture, commerce, humanitas, and dominion of Rome, while East meant Germania,
herding, no commerce, a sort of simplicity, and a fierce, independent spirit. It is these
themes that Caesar ties to his Rhine policy to distinguish Germani from Galli.

1:19 Cic. Milo., 31.1, transl. N. H. Watts, London, 1931. Religious rites had an important place in Roman
public life. See P. A. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, 1971), 58-67; Elizabeth Rawson, “Religion and Politics in the Late Second Century B.C. at
Rome,” in Roman Culture and Society: Collected Papers, 149-168.
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In 58 B.C., one chieftain with his followers caused grave disruption within Gaul.
Caesar took extreme measures to prevent a similar occurrence in 55, to no avail. In 54,
the Treveri added their strength to a string of revolts near the Rhine. This revolt,
occurring between Caesar’s two counter-invasions, proved especially dangerous because
Germanic assistance did materialize. Coordinated attacks by several groups nearly
succeeded in eliminating the Roman army’s winter quarters, and inflicted considerable
casualties. The Nervii, a community whom Caesar more than once thought defeated,
contributed to the revolt and almost overran the camp commanded by Cicero’s brother,
Quintus.160 With the exception of the Caesar’s first invasion in Book Four, the BG tends
to detail the individual Gallic civitates while treating the Germani as a single force until
the revolt of the Treveri in Book Five. This revolt in 54 would lead to a new emphasis on
cultural characteristics over geographic origin for identification. The topical change
occurring in Books Five and Six is especially striking because the two books are
continuous. The story seamlessly connects during the winter of 54. A dedicated
ethrographic portion first appears in Book Six, which splits the narrative and
conveniently draws the audience’s attention from Caesar’s second retreat from the
relatively new Germania (first called such in Book Four).161 The BG now juxtaposes the

,<K' Caes. B Gall., 2.28 (“almost wiped out”), 5.39-45 (they resurge in sufficient strength to besiege Quintus
Cicero’s winter camp), 6.3 (Caesar defeats them in one lightning strike), 7.75 (Vercingetorix levied 5,000
men from the Nervii for his army). The Nervii were one o f the newly encountered groups, as Cicero’s
correspondence (54 B.C.) indicates: “For I don’t know where your Nervii live or how distantly from us.”
Cic. Q Fr., 3.6. The Nervii had attacked Quintus and almost overwhelmed his camp during the revolt of
54. Cicero is an important case, for he had at one time (in 59) prepared to write his own geography, so one
might assume he would have the best information during his time. Cic. Att., 2.6.
161 T.P. Wiseman, “The Publication o f the De Bello Gallico,” in Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War
Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth
and Co., Ltd., 1998). A similar concern likely caused Book Five to end in the “middle” o f the action. As
an interesting aside, this section also includes interesting trivia like a bestiary. The inclusion o f such
broader curiosities may have been to dilute the audience’s expectation o f a battle with the Suebi that never
comes.
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Gerrnani and Gal 1i as ethnographic groups instead of individual civitates, and
generalizations that sporadically appeared in earlier books, particularly the description of
the Suebi, become summarized.162 The ethnographic portion expands older stereotypes
with additional details of the peoples and their customs.
Following the differences described in the section, Caesar’s standard refrain
gains increasing strength: the Galli were more civilized than the Gerrnani, with the Rhine
separating the two groups. Where the Galli were viewed in terms of civitates, the
Gerrnani had only the most basic political system of magistrates and leading men uniting
clans.163164 Access to traders, the cultivation of land, and the aristocratic culture promoted
by such economic activities clearly marked the two peoples as separate. Caesar described
the descent of the Galli, as given by the druids, from the deity Dis (Pluto), indicating
autochthony. While this could be claimed for the Galli of Celtica, hybridized peoples
like the Treveri clearly could not claim the same lineage. The ethnographic section of
Book Six does not address them directly, but strongly implies that all groups west of the
Rhine were more Galli than Gerrnani.'64 The Rhine was now seen to divide peoples in
terms of their ethnic identity - or their lingua, institutes, legibus - and Caesar examines
the basic organizational traits of Gallic societies versus those of the Germanic.

152 Caes. B Gall., 4.1. This has occasionally been advanced as a proof from internal evidence as to the
BG's periodic composition because it indicates more specific knowledge as the Books progress.
163 Caes. B Gall., 6.22, 6.24.
164 This implication is perhaps strongest when Caesar suggests reasons for the Gerrnani to avoid private
land ownership. Caes. B Gall., 6.22, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996: “to prevent people [from]
adopting agriculture in place o f . . . war; or trying to obtain large estates, the strong driving the weak out of
their properties; or building too carefully with the intention o f avoiding extreme cold and heat; or to stop
the desire for money springing up, for from this arise factions and dissent; or finally, to keep the ordinary
people content, since each man can see that his own possessions are equal to those o f the men in power.”
Not only are many o f these reasons actual features o f the Roman view o f hurnanitas that seems reflected in
the Gallic way o f life, but if one assumes a very close, even determinative, correlation between agriculture
and such traits, then most o f the Beigae, Britons, Acquitani and the like would seem more similar to the
Galli o f Celtica.

73

If one recalls the pax deoritm, it comes as no surprise that the BG includes
religion as part of its comparison. The Galli were clearly more like the Romans in
Caesar's treatment with easy identification between deities. The Galli were deeply
religious and worshipped a cross-section of the Olympians: Mercury, the divine
messenger with strong commercial associations, was foremost, implying Gallic
involvement in trade; Apollo, whom Caesar explicitly associates with medicine, but may
be implying other attributes such as poetry, indicating a certain sophistication in science
and art; Mars, the god of war to whom the Galli dedicated all their spoils and sacrificial
victims, recalling their previous fame in war, now lessened; Jupiter, a deity of the
heavens, perhaps implying cosmic order and thus order within their own societies; and
finally Minerva, goddess of wisdom and craft skills, indicating some level of technical
skill.165 In describing their basic religious practices only in terms of Roman gods, Caesar
can imply among the Galli practices familiar to his audience while suggesting the quality
of pietas, a positive quality related to one fulfilling one’s responsibilities within society
much as fides governed foreign agreements. The comparison with Germanic spiritual
practices is especially telling, because according to Caesar they did not worship deities
beyond those which they could see, such as fire or the sun.166 Thus, through the objects
of their devotion, the Galli display a degree of humanitas that the Germani do not.

165 Caes. B Gall., 6.18. This passage may not be anything more than what it is, and most scholars accept it
as Caesar identifying Celtic deities by their Roman equivalents. Mars and Jupiter would be expected in this
case, but Mercury and Minerva at least imply a relatively sophisticated economy. It is possible that Caesar
is actually characterizing the Galli by personifying their way o f life through their deities. Either way, it
likely made the Galli more familiar than before through association. Many o f these embody Gallic
characteristics that have already been discussed, but their technical skills would become an issue in the
revolt o f Vercingetorix in 52 B.C.
166 Caes. B Gall., 6.21. Also, they “have no druids to preside over religious matters.” Without informed
worship o f the gods, they lacked Rome’s ability to determine heaven’s will (fas) through any but the most
basic means, as Ariovistus did in waiting for favorable divination prior to engaging Caesar (1.50).
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Other traits also mark the difference between the two peoples. A secure frontier
was necessary because the Gauls were flighty. This trait coexisted with the good sense to
restrict certain information to their elite, to organize themselves behind patrons, and to
protect property brought to a marriage, all of which were also venerable Roman
customs.167 Many evidently knew Latin or Greek which also emphasizes their
participation within the Greco-Roman world.168 Outside of farming, commerce is the
economic activity most frequently cited by Caesar, and his earliest description of the
Galli included the indirect relationship between trade and a people’s martial quality.169
Prejudices against excessive luxury aside, Caesar's emphasis on trade reinforced the
achievement of humanitas and the formation of civitates tied to of Rome.170 The core of
the ancient prejudice blamed physical pleasures and soft living, characterized especially
by wine, for a people’s degradation in fighting ability.171 Yet even among the most
belligerent, such as the Treveri, sociopolitical stability encouraged wealth via trade over
the Germanic habit (and ideal) of daring banditry.172 The Germani did not allow private
ownership of land, nor did they practice true agriculture. They instead subsisted on
167 Caes. B Gall., 6.19-20.
168 Caes. B Gall., 1.29, 5.48, 6.14. Caesar gives several examples o f Greek “letters,” which may or may not
mean the actual language.
169 Caes. B Gall., 1.1. Cf. Strabo Geogr., 4.4.1; Balsdon, Romans and Enemies, 66; Cunliffe, The Oxford
Illustrated Prehistory o f Europe, 350-353. The flow o f goods was not quite as simplistic as Caesar
maintained, and the difference was one o f an economy o f prestige goods versus trade in bulk, especially o f
wine and animals. The Romans likely borrowed this association from the Greeks (who said much the same
about the Macedonians and others). See Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, 61.
170 Cunliffe, The Oxford Illustrated Prehistory o f Europe, 428. Following the trail o f material goods, the
“real” frontier lay nearer the Elbe not the Rhine, as Caesar seems to discover when meeting the Ubii.
171 Catherine Torigian, “The Logos o f Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum especially as revealed in its First Five
Chapters,” in Julius Caesuras Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, ed.
Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1998). Torigian suggests
that the relationship with wine and military spirit was intended to promote Roman superiority. The
Romans, despite consuming such goods, could still defeat those who did not consume them.
172 Caes. B Gall., 1.18, 4.2, 6.23. Dumnorix gained much o f his wealth and influence from control o f taxes
and tolls, a position that required the awarding of public contracts as much as armed force. The Germani
had no political superstructure and little interest in traders except to sell slaves, not even for pack animals.
Thus, contact between Rome and the Germani would Mkeiy always be conflict.
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hunting and herding, “clothing" themselves in skins and consuming meat and milk.'7<
The same paradigm was applied to Britain where “the most civilized are those who live
in Kent . . . their way of life is much the same as that of the Ga[lli]” and “inland, the
people for the most part do not plant corn-crops, but live on milk and meat and clothe
themselves in animal skins.”173174 In other words, as far as the BG is concerned, the Galli
are civilized compared to any other group Caesar encounters, and their way of life was
typified by their social and economic practices.
Two Classes - Divisions Among the Galli
For all his rhetoric against the Germani, Caesar most often fought against the
Galli, and he ascribed certain unflattering characteristics to them. One theme, introduced
in Diviciacus’ speech, is the bipolar nature of Gallic life. There were two factions to
everything. This claim of constant division conveniently reduces the threatening image
of the Galli while explaining their habit of revolting - they have not broken fides, a
would-be chieftain just seized power. This second aspect regarding divisions in Gallic
society becomes clarified in the ethnography, with two aristocratic groups, the knights
(equites) and the druids, discussed. The druids were the scholars, teachers, public
authorities, and overseers of sacrifices, in essence the order generally inclined to
respectable practices.175 His description of the second order, the knights, could be that ol
the old warrior aristocracy, which was being displaced by a growing land-owning class.
The only form of power they know is that derived from their body of retainers whom they

173 Caes. B Gall., 4.1,6.22-6.23. Specifics are added in Book Six, but much o f the material is identical to
descriptions o f the Suebi in Book Four.
174 Caes. B Gall., 5.12-5.14, transl. Carolyn Hammond, Oxford, 1996. “Civilized” includes both farming
and trade (coinage).
175 Caes. B Gall., 6.13-6.14.
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lead into battle, an annual event prior to Caesar's coming.1™ There may be an implicit
comparison with Ariovistus and ins belli in this description.
When Caesar appointed friendly leaders for local civitates, he chose the
descendents of former rulers.1 7 It may be that the druids and pro-Roman landowners
were closely associated classes. Prestige and economic wealth could reinforce each other
as sources of power and influence, and both groups were similar enough to Rome’s own
elite to compete within the frontier zone.

This was advantageous to Rome, because

both prestige and agriculture made a civitas secure and tractable through honors and
trade, increasing Rome’s influence through her ability to support local elites. The only
specifically mentioned druid, Diviciacus, was certainly prominent among the Aedui for
Caesar’s favor, and Caesar again emphasizes Diviciacus’ appeal to the Senate against
Ariovistus in the ethnography. Caesar likely intended that the Knights would be
identified with those who had sacked Rome and invaded Italy in the fourth century. The
Galli had become weaker because of the prominence of the less bellicose faction, but
they had also become worthwhile allies.1/9 The BG gives a much shorter description of

176 Caes. B Gall., 6.15.
177 It seems that this practice contributed to the revolt o f 54 B.C. A descendent o f an ancient ruler o f the
Carnutes, whom Caesar had “restored . . . to the status o f his ancestors,” was killed. Also, the appointed
ruler over the Senones was chased out. Indutiornarus had received Caesar’s public support, but material
support went to his rival Cingetorix. Indutiornarus reacted badly, and the Treveri led the Eburones in
unexpected rebellion. Caesar 5.25, 5.54. Caesar also claims (6.12) that his support allowed the Remi to
supplant the Sequani as the second leading power of Gaul (the Aedui being the other).
178 The identification o f pro and anti-Roman parties with native oligarchs/Republicans and “adventurers”
(the would-be chieftains like Orgetorix) has not convinced everyone. Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest o f Gaul,
520-523. If one identifies Caesar’s druids with a land-owning/oligarchic faction, and the knights with the
former aristocratic warrior class and their retainers, however, the BG seems to promote the former as
worthwhile allies for Rome to maintain its dominant position among the Gallic civitates.
179 This weakness was relative. The frequent Gallic defeats and Caesar’s portrayal o f their leaders at the
convention do not offer a flattering picture. On the other hand, after the revolt of Vercingetorix in 52 B.C.
forces Caesar to conduct some difficulty and lengthy sieges, he concedes that they possessed considerable
ability: “the Gajlli] used every kind o f ingenuity to counter the extraordinary bravery o f our soldiers. They
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the knights than the druids, indicating Caesar’s preference for the druids over the
warriors. This preference regarding a class of society re-emphasizes that Caesar’s ethnicdivisions depended upon political relationships, that membership within a civitas was
more meaningful than one’s genus, because the differences between the social classes
lay, essentially, with their customs.
Caesar’s overarching goal was not to define Gaul or German in ethnic terms. He
sought to strengthen Rome’s position within Gaul by drawing together as many
communities as possible into the frontier system. This u'ould serve his own political
interests as he could claim credit for defeating real or potential enemies and attaching
additional communities to Rome through treaties and hostages, who would come to share
the standards of the Roman aristocracy. The identity and habits of the peoples in the
frontier zone mattered insofar as their political, social, and economic characteristics
intersected to demonstrate humanitas. Other traits such as language, religion, and
military virtue mattered in Roman perception for their ability to maintain a propercommunity and, perhaps through patronage, for elevation within the political hierarchy.
Caesar’s Rhine policy initially created two camps based upon this hierarchy of
communities. The Gallic civitates deserved protection and inclusion, while the Germanic
chief Ariovistus did not. The characteristics that underscored their worth came more into
the foreground during Caesar’s return to the Rhine side of the frontier, from 55 to 53 B.C.
Lineage and other traits that determined what people were could be overwritten by the
memberships that determined who they were, and sustained contact with peoples on
either side of his proclaimed border caused Caesar to take this extra step. His eventual
are an extremely resourceful people [genus - a variation on gens], and particularly talented at copying and
putting into practice anything they are taught.” Caes. B Gall., 7.22.
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ethnography in Book Six would support the Rhine policy by demonstrating that the Galli
had some degree of humanitas. Thus, the way in which peoples lived increased in
significance as what had originated in a border dispute between the Sequani and
Ariovistus in 58 began to solidify into a geographic, even a national, border by 53.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION
This thesis has sought to outline an evolution in Julius Caesar’s use of the Rhine
River during the Gallic Wars of 58 to 52 B.C. It has argued that Caesar first used the
Rhine River as a political division between the Galli and the Germani, within the context
of the concept of the frontier zone. Assuming the periodic composition of Caesar’s own
narrative, the BG, this study then argued that a general Roman paradigm involving
membership in political units and a shared value system expressed through a certain way
of life further differentiated the two peoples at a later point in the conflict. This study has
emphasized the BG over the Gallic Wars and sought to employ the text in a fashion
consistent with its contemporary nature as a public document. In so doing, some broad
characteristics that informed the Roman perception of foreign identity have appeared.
The traits include autochthony, a certain degree of social and political sophistication
based on agriculture, and some defined relationship within the hierarchy of civitates
which revolved around Rome. These characteristics became tied to Caesar’s use of the
Rhine in the BG and thus were applied positively to the Galli and negatively to the
Germani.
The evolution of the Rhine from legalistic boundary to culture barrier argued by
this thesis depends upon the observations and generalizations contained within the BG.
As noted in the introduction, this study relies upon the theory of periodic composition,
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according to which each book of the text was completed individually soon after the
events recorded. The central point of this study has not been to demonstrate the
likelihood of this process aside from the barest implications of proconsular habits,
Caesar’s political interests, and Cicero’s letters. The changes in Caesar’s use of the
Rhine from legalistic boundary to cultural barrier that have been argued would
nevertheless demonstrate the lack of a complete plan or definitive use of the river at any
one point within the text. So, in a limited sense, this paper presents supporting evidence
for the periodic composition of the BG.
The first chapter of this study has focused on the Rhine River as a political
boundary in the context of a threat to the frontier zone. Caesar adopted a policy that the
Germani would not be allowed to enter Gaul. This chapter focused upon Book One, in
which the Rhine appears as the border of one people’s territory, specifically that of the
Sequani. Through the Sequani’s inclusion in frontier affairs, the Rhine was the finis of
the frontier zone as a whole. The crossing of the Germani under Ariovistus brought an
unaffiliated people into an area undergoing its own social and political changes. The
failure of Ariovistus to adapt to the conventions of the frontier zone provided Caesar with
the justification to repel the Germani from Gaul. The negative portrayal of this disruptive
chieftain was the object of the second half of Book One. Since Ariovistus would not
respect Rome’s central place, Caesar had every obligation to protect those who would,
namely the Galli of Celtica. The Rhine serves as the territorial limit for this region and
makes the identification of both the Galli and Germani immediately clear. This chapter
also introduces the various senses in which Caesar speaks of Gaul, primarily as a large
region that possessed distinct peoples (Acquitani, Galli, and Belgae) ethnically separate
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through customs (laws, institutions, and language). The Galli had two identities, the
regional one of living within Gaul, and the narrower one of living based on their ethnic
divisions, such as Celtica. In either sense, the land of the Galli, Gallia, was bounded by
the Rhine on its eastern side.
The second chapter focuses on the consequences of a second phase of Roman
activity along the Rhine with a second group of Germani in Book Four. This phase of the
Gallic Wars revolves around the defense of an expanded frontier zone that had extended
along the Rhine’s entire length and amid peoples who were not the same relation to the
Galli of the original zone. The interests of the BG shift from predominantly political
identities reliant upon ties to Rome to an attempt to systematically outline cultural
characteristics that determined humanitas, the customs assumed by the Roman
aristocracy to denote civilization. The Rhine River received a new geographic status as it
no longer just split states but also cultures. Caesar’s identification of the Galli and
Germani in broad terms emphasized voluntary elements such as their customs and social
structures, instead of determinative factors such as environment or lineage. The
organization of politically unified groups (civitates) based on a public class involved in
agriculture and trade became the standard to distinguish between Galli and Germani. The
common structures underlying Caesar’s distinction by Book Six set the basis for the
Rhine to become an ethnographic border, as increased involvement of peoples to its west
in the Roman network would emphasize the values of the landowning class. This would
in turn make the Galli effectively a separate people from the Germani.
The approach taken by this paper has downplayed Caesar’s own political career in
Rome in that it views the Gallic Wars within the context of the frontier zone concept.

Admittedly, this approach minimizes some elements of Caesar's command, particularly
the consequences of his prolonged campaigning in Rome's political arena. This was
required by this paper’s focus on how Caesar perceived the inhabitants of the frontier,
how he portrayed them in the EG, and, to some extent, what these portrayals indicate
about how the Romans in general viewed these peoples. The broader dimensions of the
Gallic Wars as a frontier conflict within the political theater of the Late Republic deserve
further research. It is hoped that this study’s discussion of the characteristics of
identification and perception will assist in future endeavors in that direction.
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